THE
CONSTITUTION:
What IS Federal Jurisdiction? |
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress
been found in the Constitution than the general expressions just cited,
the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it
would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing
an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the
freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course
of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed
by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare."
But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing had its origin with the latter. |
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the
commerce between its several members is in the number of those which have
been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which
former papers have brought to view on this subject, it may be added that
without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating
foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material
object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export
through other States from the improper contributions levied on them by
the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and
State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles
of import and export, during passage through their jurisdiction, with duties
which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former.
We may be assured by past experience that such a practice would be introduced
by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human
affairs that it would nourish increasing animosities, and not improbably
terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquility. To those
who do not view the question through the medium of passion or interest,
the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect
revenue from their uncommercial neighbors must appear not less impolitic
than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party by resentment
as well as interest to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign
trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged
and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public bodies
as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate
and immoderate gain.
The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated States has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction to other cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany it is a law of the empire that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers or passages, without the consent of the emperor and the diet; though it appears from quotation in an antecedent paper that the practice in this, as in many others in that confederacy, has not followed the law, and has produced the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members, one is that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors without the general permission. |
The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government for protection in the exercise of their duty might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part to it, to concur in the cession will be derived from the people of the State in their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated. |
This term has several meanings. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in family of nations, it may designate territory over which the sovereignty of United States extends, or it may be collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution. |
The residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution
in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clauses. The last
clause of the eighth section of the first article authorizes the national
legislature "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the powers by that
Constitution vested in the government of the United States, or in any department
or officer thereof"; and the second clause of the sixth article declares
that "the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in
pursuance thereof and the treaties made by their authority shall be
the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation of the intended government would be precisely the same if those clauses were entirely obliterated as if they were repeated in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a federal government and vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so clear a proposition that moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been so copiously vented against this part of the plan without emotions that disturb its equanimity. What is a power but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the ability to do a thing but the power of employing the means necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power but a power of making LAWS? What are the means to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes but a legislative power, or a power of making laws to lay and collect taxes? What are the proper means of executing such a power but necessary and proper laws? This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us to this palpable truth that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to pass all laws necessary and proper for the execution of that power; and what does the unfortunate and calumniated provision in question do more than declare the same truth, to wit, that the national legislature to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given might, in the execution of that power, pass all laws necessary and proper to carry it into effect? I have applied these observations thus particularly to the power of taxation because it is the immediate subject under consideration and because it is the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union. But the same process will lead to the same result in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution. And it is expressly to execute these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly called, authorizes the national legislature to pass all necessary and proper laws. If there be anything exceptionable, it must be sought for in the specific powers upon which the general declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless. |
"There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea
of danger to liberty from the militia that one is at a loss whether to
treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere
trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; or as a disingenuous
artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring
of political fanaticism. Where in the name of common sense are our fears
to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow
citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling
with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the
same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests?"
- Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist # 29 |