I am taking the liberty of requoting the entire section of the original message which goes into the typology of militia units that was developed by the FBI. It will follow my comments.  The section of message that I am commenting on will be in this typeface and my comments will be in the typeface you are reading now.Understanding the premise underlying the typology is vital to an understanding of how the government views the militia movement and how they will react to it.
   It should be obvious to all who carefully study the typology that the government, or at least the FBI agents who developed the typology, see no validity at all to the militia movement. This can be demonstrated from the fact that they view all militia units as falling into one of the four types discussed below. However, all of the types of militia units under discussion have "antigovernment rhetoric" as a basic organizational philosophy.
Thus, they are saying that there is little common ground between themselves, people who work for the government, and militia units who have "antigovernment rhetoric" as their basic philosophy. How could it be any other way? The entire typology is a "threat assessment" typology, which therefore would tend to preclude the idea that the government would at any time be willing to seriously listen to those groups which are espousing "antigovernment rhetoric." Therefore, any "cooperation" that takes place between militia units and the government will be solely at the government's discretion, with no acknowledgment by the government that there are any serious problems with how it is doing business.
   I am sorry people, but by the very way that they have set up this typology, which will be sent to law enforcement agencies all over the country, they are just about precluding the chance for a reasonable, peaceful settlement of the legitimate grievances that the various different patriot groups and militia units have with the government. Because if all that is underlying their philosophy is such "antigovernment rhetoric" as the Constitution for the United States of America; the Declaration of Independence; The Federalist Papers; the various different writings of the Founding Fathers; the lion's share of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions prior to 1933 and even quite a few U.S. Supreme Court decisions after that year, and it is all "antigovernment rhetoric", then what pray tell is government rhetoric? The idea that the government can do anything it darn well wants to? Sorry people, that isn't what this country was founded on, and that's not what all the currently serving agents of government are sworn to protect and defend. And if they can't recognize any legitimate difference between the form of government that they are sworn to protect and defend, versus the idea that government can do anything it wants to, then they are the ones who are either misled, delusional or simply power hungry. In which case, to the extent that they cannot be swayed by the force of logical argumentation based on the documents upon which this country and the current government were founded on, then that means at some point in time down the road that force will be the only answer.
    I pray it does not come to that, but Special Agent Alan C. Brantley and former Special Agent Gregory Cooper have effectively defined away any hope for a peaceful and reasonable solution.
 

The Militia Threat Assessment Typology was developed by Special Agent Alan C. Brantley and former Special Agent Gregory Cooper of the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group, Quantico, VA. The typology is based on the agents' experience and research into militia groups. For more information concerning the Militia Threat Assessment Typology, contact the authors at the:
FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135.

Category I Militia Groups

1. Conduct paramilitary training
2. Base their organizational philosophies on antigovernment rhetoric
3. Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation
4. Engage in no known criminal activity.

1. Conduct paramilitary training
2. Base their organizational philosophies on antigovernment rhetoric
3. Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation
4. Engage in criminal activity to acquire weapons and explosives. Criminal activity may range from minor firearms violations, e.g., illicit weapons sales and transfer, to illegal firearms modifications and property crimes.

1. Conduct paramilitary training
2. Base their organizational philosophies on extreme antigovernment rhetoric, denoting deep suspicion and paranoia. Group may direct threats toward specific individuals or institutional targets Maintain a primarily defensive philosophical posture. Plans for violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation, but response plans are highly detailed and may include an escalation of overt acts beyond planning, such as testing explosive devices, gathering intelligence, and identifying/conducting surveillance of potential targets
3. Engage in criminal activity, ranging from property crimes to crimes of interpersonal violence, e.g., resisting arrest, armed robberies, burglaries, and attempts to provoke confrontations with government officials.

1. Demonstrate many of the same traits and characteristics as category III groups but are likely to be smaller, more isolated cells or fringe groups whose members have grown frustrated with their peers' unwillingness to pursue a more aggressive strategy. Unlike militias in the other categories, category IV groups often maintain an openly offensive, rather than defensive, posture
2. May grow out of other less threatening militia groups or may evolve independently from any other group associations
3. Often attract individuals with frank mental disorders. These individuals may either act alone or with a small number of associates who share similar paranoid/disordered beliefs
4. Plot and engage in serious criminal activity, e.g., homicide, bombings, and other acts of a terrorist nature.

Last Revision: August 25, 1997