From: dks@eagle.mit.edu
Newsgroups: alt.fan.dan-quayle
Subject: _USS_Vincennes_: 2 of N: Manufacturing Consent
Date: 30 Jun 1995 16:05:44 -0400
Organization: The Trilateral Commission
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And immediately to proceed -- the *complete text* of an official
statement released by the US Government after the destruction of
the Iranian airliner:
  
  |  
  |  
  |  Reuter, July 3, 1988 -- London Desk
  |  
  |  Text of U.S. statement on downing of Iran Air jet
  |  .................................................
  |  
  |  WASHINGTON, July 3, Reuter -
  |  
  |      Following is the text of the statement by Adm. William Crowe,
  |      chairman of the U.S. joint chiefs of staff, on Sunday on the
  |      downing of an Iran Air Airbus A-300 by a missile from the
  |      U.S. cruiser Vincennes in the Gulf:
  |  
  |  After receiving further data and evaluating information available
  |  from the Persian Gulf, we believe that the cruiser USS Vincennes,
  |  while actively engaged with threatening Iranian surface units and
  |  protecting itself from what was concluded to be a hostile aircraft,
  |  shot down an Iranian airliner over the Straits of Hormuz.

1. Even the first paragraph is false.

2. The _Vincennes_ was not "threatened."  It sent a helicopter out to
   "patrol" (harass?) Iranian speedboats.  The Iranians fired warning
   shots, as they usually did when approached by non-Iranian helicopters.
   The US helicopter eventually retreated.  The _Vincennes_ then decided
   that those warning shots, which had hit nothing, and which were no
   surprise, were still a good enough excuse to *attack and sink* the
   Iranian boats, who were *moving away*; for which purpose the
   _Vincennes_ pursued them from international waters into Iranian
   waters, which was a clear violation of the same international law
   we were allegedly out there protecting in the first place.
   
   The _Vincennes_ is a billion-dollar guided missile cruiser in the
   "Ticonderoga" class ("Tico," for those who get their jollies through
   the fatuous use of Pentagonspeak).  It is bearer of Aegis, shield of
   Zeus.  When tax-payers are asked to pay for it, they are told that it
   is among the most sophisticated weapon-systems anywhere.  Whereas
   the Iranian boats were what Commander Carlson calls "speedboats,"
   and barely armed.  At no time was the _Vincennes_ under any "threat"
   from these boats.  There was no need for on-the-spot "self-defense,"
   at least not on the part of the _Vincennes_.  *Every move* made by
   the _Vincennes_ was made with ample preparation, and with explicit
   permission from higher up the chain of command.  This was not a
   spur-of-the-moment operation by any means -- perhaps Crowe would
   like us to call it "premeditated yet accidental self-defense"?
   
3. As for the "threat" posed by a civilian airliner flying a regularly
   scheduled flight, on course and climbing, in a commercial corridor
   -- if such poses a "threat" to us, then we are ignorant, cowardly
   fools who have no right to endanger the lives of others by taking
   it upon ourselves to "patrol" anything, anywhere, for any reason.


  |  The U.S. government deeply regrets this incident.
  
Oh?  "Deeply" enough to have changed its policy and behavior?

  
  |  A full investigation will be conducted but it is our judgment that
  |  based on the information currently available, the local commanders
  |  had sufficient reasons to believe their units were in jeopardy and
  |  they fired in self-defence.

A flat-out lie.

According to Carlson, who was one of those "local commanders."


  |  The sequence of events commenced when a Vincennes' helicopter was
  |  fired upon by Iranian surface units at 10:10 a.m. local Gulf time
  |  (0610 GMT), approximately 40 minutes before the air action. 

No.  As related by Commander David Carlson -- an eye-witness -- the
"sequence" began when the _Vincennes_ sent its helicopter "too damned
close" to the Iranian boats.  The Iranians fired warning shots -- as
they had before, so the shots were not unexpected; nor were they meant
to hit anything, and they did not.  The helicopter retreated, and that
should have been that.  Instead, the _Vincennes_ decided -- after its
helicopter was safely back on board -- that the Iranian boats posed a
"threat" -- to what? -- and so decided to sink them, allegedly in
"self-defense" -- of what?  A pack of lies.


  |  [...] approximately 40 minutes before the air action.

If Admiral Crowe can use the term "air action" to describe the wanton
destruction of a civilian airliner, then others can call it *murder*.


  |  Subsequently, the Vincennes identified the Iranian firing
  |  units and closed to engage. The Iranian gunboats turned toward
  |  Vincennes at high speed and were engaged at 10:42 a.m. with gunfire
  |  from the cruiser and the frigate Albert B Montgomery.

Another pack of lies.  To portray the Iranian "gunboats" as a threat
to to the _Vincennes_ is either a flat-out lie or a confession that
the US defense budget is a total waste of money.  In any case, the
Iranian boats turned towards the _Vincennes_ only *after* the
_Vincennes_ had begun to fire on *them*.

And when Crowe says the _Vincennes_ "closed to engage," what he should
*really* say is that the _Vincennes_ violated Iran's sovereignty by
violating its territorial waters.  Our Rules of Engagement were written
such that they restricted "hot pursuit" by US forces; so even *that*
implausible loophole is not available to the captain and crew of the
Mighty _Vincennes_.  To put it bluntly, they were *outlaws* even
*before* they shot down the airliner.

(Then again, having butchered two hundred and ninety people, including
more than sixty children, the niceties of international law are hardly
the first burden on whatever conscience they might be able to muster.)



  |  While so involved, the Vincennes detected an aircraft over Iran at
  |  about 10:47 a.m., again local time. This aircraft headed toward the
  |  Vincennes and commenced closing at high speed.

Words.

The aircraft was *climbing* -- not diving to attack anything.  It was
flying at the normal speed for a just-departing airliner.  It was
identifying itself properly as a commercial aircraft.  It was on a
regularly scheduled flight, on course, and flying in the middle of an
air corridor that -- according to Iranian air-traffic control records
-- was used by an average of more than 150 *civilian* flights per day
the week before the incident.

That works out to about one flight every ten minutes on average.
Apparently, the other 149 flights that day were just lucky that the
_Vincennes_ was not out there Protecting Democracy when *they* were
in the sky.

The airport in Dubai is among the busiest international airline hubs
in the world.  If we excuse the barbarity of the _Vincennes_ as an
"accident" this time, what will we say the next time?  It's not simply
a matter of killing troublesome Iranians and worthless Arabs and such
-- even the blue-eyed sky-dudes of Lufthansa and the tanned lovelies
of Qantas are frequent visitors in Dubai.  Would we blow _them_ up as
well?  Would we say _they_ should be blamed for their own destruction?

Indeed, if it had been not just one measly airliner ascending but
actually two or three Jumbo Jets approaching for descent -- imagine
the panic! -- a Entire Fleet of Enemy Bumblewoozers DIVING TO ATTACK!
Imagine the mayhem.  We gave Captain Rogers a medal for killing three
hundred Iranians.  Imagine how many medals we might have had to give
the poor guy to console him for his excellent stewardship of an even
"more" spectacular "accident."

But that's heavy stuff.

Let's hear nice old Admiral Crowe again:

  |  Vincennes immediately began assessing this new threat. The suspect
  |  aircraft was outside the prescribed commercial air corridor. More
  |  importantly, the aircraft headed directly for Vincennes on a
  |  constant bearing at high speed -- approximately 450 knots.

"Outside the prescribed corridor"?  Utter nonsense, at best.

And what is the truth?  The following items will give you some idea.
Notice the dates.  And these are not even the first small indications
of truth that appeared.  The official US media -- e.g., the wondrous
_New York_Times_, were (to put it mildly) spellbound in open-mouthed
thralldom by a former actor's press agents; and to this day have not
fully reconciled themselves to some aspects of the truth.  But other
"fringe" elements of the press had somewhat less trouble from the
beginning -- especially if, like Reuter's London desk, they happened
to be located outside the USA.

Here's one example to counter Crowe's nonsense:

      |  
      |  _Washington_Post_,
      |  Monday, July 11, 1988
      |  
      |  [...]  The Pentagon's account of the incident came
      |  under fire from a new direction Sunday [July 10]
      |  when the Sunday Times of London reported that the
      |  British Government Communications Headquarters
      |  [GCHQ] had determined from electronic eavesdropping
      |  that the Iranian Airbus left Bandar Abbas only three
      |  minutes behind schedule, was flying in the correct
      |  flight path [...], and was climbing when the
      |  Vincennes shot it down.  [...]
      |  

I don't have the full text of the original _Times_ article at hand,
but along with the obligatory denials from the Foreign Office, etc.,
I know it also says the following: (1) GCHQ had prepared a report
based on its continuous monitoring of international radio traffic
in the area; (2) it heard general warnings on general frequencies,
but no warning sent from the _Vincennes_ to the airliner itself;
(3) it found the crew of the airliner in *obvious* conversation
with ground controllers; (4) it found improbable the suggestion that
the airliner's flight path was seen as threatening the _Vincennes_;
(5) it said Her Majesty's Navy would never have considered opening
fire in the circumstances; (6) it blamed the US Navy for the killing.

And then:

      |  
      |  UNITED NATIONS, July 15, 1988  Reuter - A transcript
      |  of radio calls released by Iran indicates its Airbus
      |  was climbing from 12,000 feet to 14,000 feet when it
      |  was shot down by the U.S. cruiser Vincennes on July 3,
      |  killing all 290 aboard.
      |  
      |  The Pentagon has said the captain of the Vincennes
      |  believed the plane was a fighter, between 7,000 feet
      |  and 9,000 feet and descending over the Gulf when the
      |  ship fired its missiles.
      |  
      |  In addition to altitude, the transcript appears to
      |  support Iran's contention that Flight 655 was sending
      |  out normal radar signals for a civilian plane [...]
      |  
      |  The pilot of the Airbus and the control tower at the
      |  Iranian city of Bandar Abbas exchanged "Good days"
      |  seconds before the Airbus was shot down [...]
      |  
      |  [The] transcript represented the radio conversations
      |  exchanged by controllers at Tehran, Bandar Abbas,
      |  Dubai (the aircraft's destination) and the pilot.
      |  
      |  According to the transcript, Dubai agreed to the
      |  altitude assignment of 14,000 feet and the code for
      |  the transponder, which planes use to enhance radar
      |  signals.  The transponder code, "Squawk 6760," was
      |  confirmed each step of the way.
      |  
      |  At one point, before takeoff from Bandar Abbas [...]
      |  the following exchange: "Tower - IR 655 is cleared to
      |  destination OMDB (Dubai) via flight plan route.  Climb
      |  and maintain FL 140 Squawk 6760." "IR 655 - Roger.
      |  Cleared to destination flight plan route FL 140,
      |  Squawk Code 6760."  "Tower - Squawk 6760 readback is
      |  correct. Call when ready for takeoff."  The jet's last
      |  position report was from a checkpoint named Mobet,
      |  about 10 miles (16 km) from the Vincennes, the
      |  transcript showed.
      |  
      |  "IR 655 - APP, IR 655 position MOBET out of 120
      |  (12,000 ft)"  It quoted the controller as confirming
      |  the position by saying: "IR 655, Roger. Contact Tehran
      |  Control 133.4. Have a nice day." The pilot responded:
      |  "IR 655 - Thank you. Good day."
      |  

And:

      |
      |  WASHINGTON, Aug 2 [1988], Reuter - A U.S. defence report has
      |  concluded [that although the ship's commander may have been
      |  told] the plane was descending at high speed toward the ship
      |  as an attacking F-14 would do, records made by the Aegis
      |  system showed otherwise.
      |  
      |  The records show the plane was climbing, not descending, and
      |  was flying far slower than the 450 nautical miles per hour an
      |  F-14 would have been flying, ABC said.
      |  
      |  "It could not immediately be learned whether the report says
      |  those in the ship's combat information centre misinterpreted the
      |  information or conveyed it inaccurately to Captain Will Rogers,"
      |  the network said.
      |  
      |  The Defence Department had no immediate comment on the report.
      |

And:

      |  
      |  MONTREAL, Dec 2, 1988  Reuter - An Iranian airliner shot
      |  down by a U.S. warship in the Gulf last July received its
      |  only direct warning 40 seconds before a missile slammed
      |  into it, the Canadian Press said on Friday, quoting a
      |  report by the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
      |  
      |  [...]
      |  
      |  The report, prepared by an ICAO technical team, said the
      |  specific warning for the airliner did not come from the
      |  Vincennes, which fired the missile, but from another U.S.
      |  warship, the Sides, in the area.
      |  
      |  It said several general warnings were issued to the Iran
      |  Air A-300 Airbus on general military and civilian emergency
      |  radio frequencies.
      |  
      |  But the only warning coded specifically for the airliner
      |  came just 40 seconds before the jet was destroyed by
      |  surface-to-air missiles, said the report prepared for ICAO,
      |  a United Nations organisation based in Montreal.
      |  
      |  A warning coded for the civilian aircraft "could have been
      |  immediately recognisable to the flight crew but was given
      |  only in the final challenge," the report said.
      |  
      |  [...]
      |  
      |  The ICAO report said the sophisticated Aegis radar system
      |  on the Vincennes "recorded a flight profile consistent with
      |  a normal climb profile of an Airbus A-300." The report also
      |  said the aircraft was climbing normally from Bandar Abbas
      |  airport in Iran and was, while not exactly on the
      |  internationally determined flight corridor across the Gulf,
      |  well within the "lateral" boundaries of the corridor.
      |  
      |  The Pentagon investigation found a number of factors led to
      |  the airliner being mistaken for an F-14 fighter, but the
      |  Aegis radar system, billed as the world's most sophisticated,
      |  had performed properly.
      |  
      |  Vincennes Captain Will Rogers said in September that Iran
      |  Air 655 had been continually climbing from Bandar Abbas
      |  until it was shot down, 13 km (eight miles) from the U.S.
      |  warship.
      |  
      |  [...]
      |  

And Crowe wants us to believe that the airliner was threatening the
Mighty _Vincennes_ -- the stench of garbage is unmistakeable.

The _Vincennes_ is among the most sophisticated ships afloat, its
Aegis system among the most sophisticated electronics out there.
For the _Vincennes_ not to have correctly identified the airliner
in the light of its perfectly normal behavior and all its cheerful
transmissions is either (1) a flat-out lie or (2) solid proof that
the trillions spent on our so-called "defense" are a bad joke.

But never mind that.  Let's continue with Crowe's statement:
  
  |  A warning was sent on both military and civilian distress
  |  frequencies beginning at 10:49 a.m. This procedure was repeated
  |  several times, but the aircraft neither answered nor changed its
  |  course.
  
The billion-dollar _Vincennes_ had anywhere between five and twenty
minutes to identify the airliner: time in which the crew of the
airliner was happily chatting with air-traffic controllers in the
region on frequencies monitored by everyone else, and easily monitored
by the billion-dollar _Vincennes_.

By contrast, the airliner itself received not even *one* warning from
the billion-dollar _Vincennes_; and, just *forty seconds* before it
was blown out of the sky, only one warning from another US vessel.

And the reaction on board the _Vincennes_ was:

      |  
      |  WASHINGTON, Aug 26, 1988  Reuter - Dramatic film shot
      |  aboard the U.S. cruiser Vincennes shows a Navy radar
      |  operator shouting exultantly "that was a dead on!"
      |  
      |  [...]
      |  
      |  "Oh dead. We had it, God, that was dead on!" the radar
      |  operator shouted as the Airbus disappeared from his
      |  screen.
      |  
      |  The Pentagon has acknowledged mistakes aboard the
      |  Vincennes were partly responsible for the downing of
      |  the passenger jet, but put most of the blame on the
      |  then tense conditions in the Gulf and on Iran's actions.
      |  

The word "despicable" does not even *begin* to suffice.

Anyway, Crowe continues with his official statement:
  
  |  There were electronic indications on Vincennes that led it
  |  to believe that the aircraft was an F-14 (there have been a
  |  number of F-14 flights in the area over the last few days).

These "electronic indications" were nothing but hormones.  At best.
Of course, as with all official hormonal flows, they were classified.

As for "a number of F-14 flights in the area" ... what a ridiculous
excuse for an excuse.  What "area"?  The airliner had not entered the
area designated as "war zone" by the two (official) combatants.  It
was flying in a well-traveled commercial air-corridor.  More than 150
civilian flights *per day* used exactly the same distinct air-corridor:
were we going to explode each and every one of them just because F-14s
had been seen nearby?  I should have thought that the best minds in the
Pentagon could have come up with a better way to insult our intelligence.


  |  Given the threatening flight profile and the decreasing range, the
  |  aircraft was declared 'hostile' at 10:51 a.m. local. At 10:54 a.m.,
  |  when the aircraft was about nine miles away, Vincennes fired two
  |  Standard surface-to-air missiles, at least one of which hit at an
  |  approximate range of six miles. Due to limited visibility, the
  |  aircraft was not visually sighted until the missile impacted.

According to eye-witness testimony, there was no "threatening" flight
profile in the first place -- the track was explicitly evaluated and
found to be a "nonthreat" by the commander of the USS _Sides_.


  |  In understanding this incident, it is important to appreciate
  |  the total context in which our ships operate.
  
Yes.

For example: (1) "Our ships" had no right to be there in the first
place; (2) being there, thousands of miles away from meaningful
human life, we placed zero value on the safety of vaguely humanoid
civilians -- they were disposable, towelhead trash, hardly a vital
interest of the United States of America; (3) we were there more to
protect our lust for gasoline -- a far more important commodity
than the lives of other people; and (4) if while protecting our
gasoline urge we could also do small and occasional favors for the
great Saddam Hussein, our stooge of the moment, so much the better.

The *stated* goal of US forces in the gulf was to patrol the area to
keep it safe for civilian traffic.  What was the first thing our
billion-dollar Aegis cruiser ever did in "combat"?  Destroy a civilian
airliner.  This is, to say the least, not a convincing way to show how
much importance US forces placed on the protection of civilians.

Yes, I should say Crowe was right about one thing: it _is_ important
to "appreciate" the "total context" in which "our ships operate."

So let's have Bill Crowe again:

  |  The U.S. government emphasised from the outset
  |  that committing military units to the Persian Gulf mission
  |  would involve risks and uncertainties.
  
Well, how bloody nice of us.  We should tell it to the dead pilgrims
still floating in the Gulf.  *We* needed to protect *our* gasoline,
and so *you* were subject to various "risks and uncertainties."  You
silly Iranians.  You really shouldn't have taken such a huge risk by
being born Iranian.  Nyuk-nyuk-nyuk.

This is the filth and obscenity that passes for the canonical "foreign 
policy" of the United States of America.

And it is because they expose this filth and obscenity that Herman
and Chomsky and others are attacked by the mandarins and their
muddle-headed mercenaries.

But I digress.  Let's get back to Crowe:
  
  |  The U.S. government emphasised from the outset
  |  that committing military units to the Persian Gulf mission
  |  would involve risks and uncertainties.
  |  This conclusion has been reinforced by several incidents, e.g.
  |  Bridgeton mining, the Stark tragedy and the Samuel B Roberts'
  |  mining.
  
We choose to place the lives of civilians "at risk" with our
missiles, and these prior "incidents" are our *excuses*?
  
  
  |  A decision was made early in the commitment to give our commanders
  |  sufficient latitude to protect their people and equipment when
  |  hostile intent was manifested.

Ah, but no "hostile intent was manifested" by a civilian airliner
that was just minding its own peaceful business.

Which is a damn sight more than we can say for the _Vincennes_.


  |  [US forces] do not have to be shot at before responding.

Such understatement.  He must be a Toastmaster.  Or maybe a Rotarian.

Notice the "responding."  "Responding" to what, exactly?  Are we
"responding" if we attack first?  What fascinating use of language.

  
  |  Throughout our involvement in the Persian Gulf, the Iranian
  |  government has repeatedly threatened and fired upon U.S. forces.

That's not how David Carlson saw it, and he actually served there.


  |  In September 1987, as a result of the attack on the USS Stark and
  |  other incidents, the U.S. issued a Notice to Airmen which advised
  |  all aircraft in the Persian Gulf region that U.S. Navy ships were
  |  taking additional precautions and of the need to identify
  |  themselves and to state their intentions. Additionally, they were
  |  advised that failure to respond to requests for identification and
  |  intentions, or to warnings, and operating in a threatening manner
  |  could place the aircraft at risk by U.S. defensive measures.

That's a lot of words to hide the fact that the _Stark_ was
actually attacked by *our friends* -- Saddam Hussein and company.


  |  As to the recent environment, we have altered our forces of
  |  indications that Iranian units might attempt to carry out attacks
  |  against our forces over the July 4th holiday.

A bit more flag-waving, to help manufacture consent?

Let's see if this whole propaganda operation actually works.

On July 6, three days after the incident, i.e., two days after the
aforementioned July 4, i.e., after a lot of very good "explaining"
by various bastards wearing flags and uniforms, here's what the
American people found themselves believing about the "incident" and
about their own part in it:


                                      Poll released July 6, 1988 by
                
                                          ABC News           CNN
                                      Washington Post     USA Today
                                      
    Who is more to blame?                                  61% Iran
    US attack & destruction justified?    71% Yes             
    US forces acted correctly?            80% Yes          75% Yes
  
    US apology good enough?               63% Yes          58% Yes
    US pay compensation?                  61% No           50% No

And the Pentagon's real objective:

    US should stay in Gulf to
       keep protecting civilians?                          72% YES

"Manufacturing consent."  QED.



Dhanesh


  Bill Crowe concludes his epic of falsehood and _non_sequitur_:

  |  We are still in the process of reconciling and collating all the
  |  data.  An official investigation of the incident will be conducted
  |  by Rear Admiral William Fogarty of the U.S. Central Command.

  Useless.  Worse than useless.