Lawrence E. Walsh, Independent Counsel // August 4, 1993, Washington, D.C. //
            Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions ]


Investigations and Cases: Officers of the Department of Defense
(U.S. v. Caspar W. Weinberger and Related Investigations)


1 After the revelation of the Iran intiative, Weinberger stated that he had "seriously contemplated resignation" in January 1986 but decided against it. (Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (Warner Books, 1990), pp. 383-84 (hereafter, "Weinberger, Fighting for Peace"). No contemporaneous document corroborates this claim.
2 Memorandum from McFarlane to Shultz and Weinberger, "Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Iran," 6/17/85, AKW 001713-20.
3 Ibid., AKW 001719.
4 Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
5 Weinberger Note, circa 6/18/85, ALZ 0049658. Powell also delivered a copy of the draft NSDD, with a typed version of Weinberger's note, to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Howard Taft IV, who reviewed it on June 20, 1985. (ALZ 004401 ("DEP SEC HAS SEEN").)
6 Memorandum from Armitage to Ikle, 7/13/85, ALZ 0071353-62 (transmitting alternative draft memoranda for Weinberger's consideration in responding to McFarlane); Memorandum from Armitage to Weinberger, 7/16/85, ALZ 004400.
7 Memorandum from Weinberger to McFarlane, 7/16/85, AKW 001710. Shultz had sent McFarlane a similar response to the draft NSDD. (Memorandum from Shultz to McFarlane, 6/29/85, AKW 005357 ("I . . . disagree with the suggestion that our efforts to reduce arms flows to Iran should be ended.").)
8 Cable from McFarlane to Shultz, 7/13/85, ALV 005092-95 (Shultz file copy).

In his 1990 book, Weinberger noted McFarlane's testimony regarding his July 13 briefings of Shultz and Weinberger, but dismissed it sarcastically:

His "recollection" . . . exceeds mine on this, as it did on many other points. I recall no such meeting. July 13 was the Saturday the President was operated on for abdominal cancer; and I was going over office papers in the garden at our home in McLean, Virginia, and not being briefed by McFarlane.

(Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 366.) In fact, Weinberger's diary entries for July 13, 1985 -- which are part of the voluminous Weinberger note collection that the OIC first located in 1991 -- memorialize five separate conversations, apparently by telephone, with McFarlane, plus Weinberger's conversation with General Powell, regarding a conversation Powell had had with McFarlane. (Weinberger Diary, 7/13/85, ALZ 0039537H-37J.)

Although none of these diary entries record substantive information regarding hostages, Israel or Iran, that omission could reflect Weinberger's apparent decision to make no detailed notes during July and early August 1985 regarding this activity. (See, e.g., Weinberger Diary, 8/6/85, ALZ 0039585-87 (no notes of a White House meeting on Iran, which Weinberger later testified he attended on this date)). On Monday, July 15, 1985, Weinberger did make a cryptic diary entry -- "Saw Colin Powell -- re proposed Iran" -- that is consistent with McFarlane's testimony about his disclosures to Weinberger two days earlier. (Weinberger Diary, 7/15/85, ALZ 0039539.)

10 Vessey, Select Committees Deposition, 4/17/87, pp. 30-31. In a subsequent interview, Vessey elaborated, explaining that Weinberger had first offered Vessey a ride to the White House meeting and then, after checking, had to tell Vessey that he was not invited. The next day, Weinberger told Vessey that he " 'wouldn't believe what was being proposed,' namely, negotiation with the Iranians." (Vessey, FBI 302, 6/11/92, p. 1.)
11 Weinberger, Select Committees Testimony, 7/31/87, pp. 88-89; cf. Weinberger, Tower Commission Testimony, 1/14/87, p. 5 ("I do not have memory of an August [1985] meeting as such, but I gather that there was an August [1985] meeting, and there was certainly a meeting with the President upstairs in the residence after he got out of the hospital.").
12 McFarlane, FBI 302, 3/20/92, p. 2. In President Reagan's August 23, 1985, diary entry, which he made available for review to Independent Counsel, in excerpted form, he wrote that he had "received 'secret phone' call from Bud McFarlane -- seems a man high-up in the Iranian govt. believes he can deliver all or part of the 7 kidnap victims -- I had some decisions to make about a few points -- but they were easy to make -- now we must wait."
13 McFarlane, FBI 302, 3/20/92, pp. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9.
14 Ibid., p. 3.
15 Weinberger Diary, 8/22/85, ALZ 0039605 ("Bud McFarlane fm [from] AF1 [Air Force One] -- wants to meet with me tonight -- "); Powell, Select Committees Deposition, 6/19/87, pp. 5-8, 52.
16 Powell, FBI 302, 12/5/86, p. 1; Powell, Select Committees Interview Memorandum, 4/17/87, p. 2, AMY 000561. Although Powell could not supply a precise date for this meeting (Powell, Select Committees Deposition, 6/19/87, p. 39, placing this meeting "in the summer" of 1985), Weinberger's diary indicates that the meeting occurred in his office on August 22, 1985, and was attended by Weinberger, McFarlane, Powell and General Charles Gabriel, the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Weinberger Diary, 8/22/85, ALZ 0039606-07). Weinberger's typed calendar, which corroborates the attendees and the location, indicates that the meeting lasted from approximately 7:30 until 8:10 p.m. (Weinberger Calendar, 8/22/85, LC-007474.)
17 Powell, Select Committees Deposition, 6/19/87, p. 5.
18 Powell, FBI Interview Transcript, 12/5/86, ALZ 0047719-20; accord Powell, Select Committees Deposition, 6/19/87, p. 5; see also Weinberger Diary, 8/22/85, ALZ 0039606-07 ("Bud McFarlane, Charles Gabriel, CP [Powell] in office. Peres sent Israeli Envoy to tell us 2 Iranians offered to return some of our kidnappees -- want us to have better attitude toward Iran after Khomeni -- I argued that we tell them we wanted all hostages back") (emphasis in original).
19 Ibid., 8/23/85, ALZ 0039608 ("Conference call -- with Bud McFarlane + General Gabriel -- on Iranian proposal to let us have our Kidnappees -- agreed we should deal directly with Iranians + not thru Israelis + that we should get guarantees that we'll get them all -- + take them off w helos fm Tripoli Beach").
20 See, e.g., ibid., 8/24/85, ALZ 0039611A; bid., 8/26/85, ALZ 0039613; ibid., 8/29/85, ALZ 0039621-22; ibid., 9/3/85, ALZ 0039627, ALZ 0039630; ibid., 9/11/85, ALZ 0039647-48.
21 The DoD determined in 1993 that the senior military officer's name and all details relating to this subject continue to be classified. See Classified Appendix to this chapter.

Weinberger Diary, 8/29/85, ALZ 0039621-22. The senior military officer said that he was not aware that he had ever been considered for a meeting with Iranians and, notwithstanding Weinberger's diary notes, he stated emphatically that he had no knowledge of any dealings with Iranians. (Senior Military Officer, FBI 302, 1/28/92, p. 3.) The senior military officer also said that he never dealt with Oliver North and never heard his name mentioned in connection with the hostage Benjamin Weir's release; he described North as "simply a staff officer on the periphery. . . ." (Ibid., pp. 2-3.)

The senior military officer's account conflicts with the contemporaneous evidence. Weinberger's diary relates that the officer embarked on a mission involving travel to Vienna, Austria -- at McFarlane's request and with the approval of Weinberger and General Vessey -- in early September 1985 "to see if Iranians will release our hostages. . . ." (Weinberger Diary, 9/6/85, ALZ 0039637; accord Ibid., 8/29/85, ALZ 0039621-22; ibid., 9/3/85, ALZ 0039627, ALZ 0039630; ibid., 9/4/85, ALZ 0039632.) North's notebook quotes Adm. Moreau, who supervised the officer in the JCS chain of command (Senior Military Officer, FBI 302, 1/28/92, p. 2), as reporting on Wednesday, August 28, 1985, that "[senior military officer]" had been "briefed Monday." (North Note, 8/28/85, AMX 001340.) On September 4, 1985, he applied for and received a ten-year passport in a false name. (Department of State Passport Application, 9/4/85, ALW 015697 (signed by "[alias]" and bearing the Senior Military Officer's photograph); accord ALW 015698 (identification page of passport).) Contemporaneous notes show that North sought a false passport for himself and a second false passport for the Senior Military Officer; that North invoked Moreau's name while making this request; that North was going to Europe with the military officer; that they would be using the aliases; and that their reservations were in the latter alias. (Quinn Note, 8/30/85, ALV 002319 ("Secure call -- Ollie North -- . . . Asked for false passport for trip to Europe -- "); Ibid., 9/4/85, ALV 002320 ("OLLIE -- One more passport -- DoD -- "); Raphel Note, 9/10/85, ALW 0045285 (North/[Senior Military Officer] -- to Europe); Platt Note, 9/10/85, ALW 0036312 ("Ollie North, [Senior Military Officer] -- Goode, [false name]"); North Note, 9/4/85, AMX 001723 ("TICKETS & HOTEL: [false name]"); see also Platt Note, 9/10/85, ALW 0036317 ("Armacost heard from Pdx [Poindexter] . . . -- That Ollie + friend going nowhere"); see generally Memorandum for the Record from Martel, "Subject: Request for Passport Retrieval," 11/25/86, ALW 015668 (passport believed issued for Senior Military Officer at the request of Ambassador Robert B. Oakley); Memorandum from Coburn to George, 10/16/87, ALW 015667; Coburn, FBI 302, 10/30/87, p. 3.)

23 Weinberger Diary, 9/15/85, ALZ 0039653F.
24 Ibid., 9/17/85, ALZ 0039659.
25 AMW 0001918-40. The apparent reason for delivering the Pentagon copy of these intelligence reports to Adm. Moreau during the first weeks of September 1985 was the fact that the senior military officer who was to meet with Iranian representatives during that period reported to the Joint Staff. (Senior Military Officer, FBI 302, 1/28/92, p. 2.) The intelligence reports, in short, were initially delivered to the senior military officer's commanding officers, Moreau and Gen. Vessey, who in turn reported with him to Weinberger. (Ibid., p. 3.) Independent Counsel was not able to obtain additional information regarding Moreau's handling of the initial intelligence reports because he died shortly before Independent Counsel was appointed in December 1986.
26 Powell, FBI 302, 2/24/92, p. 5.
27 Weinberger Diary, 9/17/85, ALZ 0039659.
28 Ibid., 9/20/85, ALZ 0039671; accord Intelligence Report, AMW 0001937.
29 Weinberger Diary, 10/3/85, ALZ 0039703.
30 Ibid., 10/4/85, ALZ 0039704.
31 Ibid., 11/9/85, ALZ 0039774.
32 Ibid., 11/10/85, ALZ 0039775; ibid., 11/19/85, ALZ 0039795.
33 Ibid., 11/19/85, ALZ 0039795.
34 Powell, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, pp. 57-58.
35 Koch, FBI 302, 3/23/92, p. 9. Koch was acting assistant secretary of defense because Armitage was traveling from November 15 to November 23, 1985. After Armitage returned to the United States in late November, Powell informed him of the activity that had occurred during his foreign trip. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.)
36 Gaffney, who was DSAA's director of plans at the time, was acting director of DSAA during the week of November 18, 1985, because the director, Lt. Gen. Philip Gast, was traveling with the Armitage delegation, and the deputy director, Glenn A. Rudd, was out of town. (Gaffney, FBI 302, 4/9/92, p. 2; Gaffney, Select Committees Interview Memorandum, 4/10/87, pp. 3, 5-6, AMY 000542, AMY 000545-46.)
37 Gaffney, Select Committees Deposition, 6/16/87, pp. 62-63, 73.
38 Ibid., p. 81; Gaffney, Select Committees Interview Memorandum, 4/10/87, p. 8.
39 Weinberger Diary, 11/19/85, ALZ 0039797.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 11/20/85, ALZ 0039799. There is no record that Weinberger attempted to contact the President to voice his opposition or to seek reconsideration of this decision.
42 Ibid., 11/20/85, ALZ 0039801.
43 Ibid.; ibid., 11/21/85, ALZ 0039802.

"Point Paper: Hawk Missiles for Iran," ALZ 000353-54. A second copy of Gaffney's point paper, which is labeled "REVISED" in his handwriting but in fact contains only one less word, apparently was located in Weinberger's office complex during an April 1987 search for Iran/contra documents. On April 17, 1987, Col. James F. Lemon, the executive secretary in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, transmitted this version of Gaffney's point paper to the DoD general counsel and the assistant general counsel who were collecting Iran/contra documents, with a cover memorandum explaining that the point paper had been located during a search, conducted at the general counsel's instruction in response to document requests from the Select Committees, of "the Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Executive Secretariat." (Memorandum from Lemon to Garrett and Shapiro, with attached "Point Paper: Hawk Missiles for Iran," 4/17/87, ALZ 0058446-48.)

Although the revised Gaffney point paper and Lemon's cover memorandum were responsive to Independent Counsel's 1987 omnibus requests for DoD documents, they were not made available to the OIC until 1992. There also is no record that the DoD Office of General Counsel ever provided this version of Gaffney's point paper or the information regarding its location in Weinberger's office to the Select Committees. When the Select Committees questioned Weinberger using Gaffney's file copy of the point paper, Weinberger said he did not recall seeing the document contemporaneously. (Weinberger, Select Committees Testimony, 6/17/87, pp. 22, 41.)

45 Weinberger Diary, 11/23/85, ALZ 0039806A ("Colin Powell -- . . . no hostage release last night").
46 Intelligence report, 11/25/85, AMW 0002001-03 ("Subj: Lebanese Kidnappings: . . . Delivery Made on 24 November 1985").
47 Intelligence reports, AMW 0002010-12 (12/11/85), AMW 002016-17 (12/12/85).

Armitage, Meeting Log, 12/2/85, ALZ 016436. Two days after Meron's meeting with Armitage, the Director of DSAA's Israel desk, Diana Blundell, sent an information paper on Israel's HAWK missile systems through DSAA Deputy Director Rudd to Lt. Gen. Gast, the director of DSAA. (Information Paper SUBJECT: Israel -- HAWK Missile System, circa 12/4/85, ALZ 0044276.) Blundell's paper contains detailed information on the status and schedule for improving Israel's HAWK missile batteries, the anticipated schedule for delivering modified missiles to Israel that would be compatible with the improved batteries, and the numbers of basic and improved HAWK missiles that Israel had received from the U.S. in the past. Blundell's cover note transmitting the information paper to Rudd and Gast says that they had requested a paper "on I-HAWK deliveries to Israel." (Memorandum from Blundell through Rudd to Gast, 12/4/85, ALZ 0044275.) Rudd's schedule indicates that, after he, Gast and Blundell had received a farewell "courtesy call" from Gen. Meron on December 2, 1985; Rudd, Gast, Blundell and others met the next afternoon "re: I-HAWK. . . ." (Rudd Schedule, 12/2/85, ALZ 0044110; ibid., 12/3/85, ALZ 0044110.) This meeting preceded Blundell's paper on I-HAWK deliveries to Israel.

Blundell's information paper and the related Rudd schedule documents are consistent with a response to an Israeli request during the first week of December 1985 for prompt replenishment of the 18 HAWK missiles that Israel had transferred to Iran the previous week. Armitage, one possible source of such a request, did not recall possessing knowledge in early December 1985 of Israel's HAWK shipment. Because the Blundell and Rudd documents were not produced by DoD to the OIC until 1992 (and apparently never were produced to the Select Committees), the OIC did not pursue the matter after Blundell stated in 1992 that she had no recollection whatsoever of the events that prompted her 1985 information paper. (Blundell, FBI 302, 5/29/92, pp. 4-5.)

49 Armitage Meeting Log, 12/3/85, ALZ 016437 ("1230-1345 Ollie North -- Lunch in office").
50 Ibid., 12/5/85, ALZ 016439 ("1300 -- Gen Secord").
51 See Armitage section below.
52 Gaffney, Select Committees Deposition, 6/22/87, p. 24 (joint deposition with Rudd).
53 Prospects for Immediate Shipment of I-HAWK and I-TOW Missiles, ALZ 0058747.
54 Raphel served as the principal deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Near Eastern and Asian Affairs (NEA) during 1985 and 1986.
55 Possibility for Leaks, ALZ 004343.
56 Weinberger Diary, 12/5/85, ALZ 0039827 ("Colin Powell in room -- re meeting Saturday with President on Iran hostages + TOW's").
57 Ibid., 12/2/85, ALZ 0039818 (departure for Europe); ibid., 12/6/85, ALZ 0039829 (return to U.S.).
58 Ibid., 12/7/85, ALZ 0039830 ("Met with Colin Powell + Rich Armitage -- re NSC Plan to let Israelis give Iranians 50 Hawks + 3300 TOWs in return for 5 hostages -- NSC will present it as a means of helping group that wants to overthrow gov't -- But no assu assurance that any of this goes   weapons will go to Iranian Army.").
59 Ibid., 12/7/85, ALZ 0039831.
60 Ibid. ("I argued strongly that we have an embargo that makes arms sales to Iran illegal + President couldn't violate it -- + that 'washing' transaction thru Israel wouldn't make it legal. Shultz, Don Regan agreed.").
61 Ibid. ("President sd. he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages'.").
62 Ibid., ALZ 0039832, ALZ 0039838 ("Called McFarlane in Washington -- he is going to London to advise President's decision that we will not ransom our hostages -- he will discuss with UK Possibility of their selling some arms to negotiators.") (emphasis in original).
63 Weinberger Meeting Notes, 12/10/85, ALZ 0040645 ("We still must replace 500 TOWs to Israel").
64 Weinberger Diary, 12/10/85, ALZ 0039840 ("President still wants to try to get hostage released -- But forcible storming would mean many deaths -- decided to send Dick Walters to Damascus [with classified message].").
65 Weinberger Meeting Note, 1/6/86, ALZ 0042650-51 ("Nir proposed selling 4000 TOWs (unimp. [unimproved]) -- No launchers -- + Israelis would deliver 500 via Israeli plane -- if all 5 US hostages released -- then Israelis want 4000 TOW replacements, + If they are cauget caught they would want us to acknowledge that we knew of it + did not object.") (emphasis in original). Weinberger Diary, 1/6/86, ALZ 0039880 ("John Poindexter in office. Another Israeli-Iranian scheme offering freedom to hostages in return for TOW missiles -- Told him I opposed it.").
66 Weinberger Meeting Note, 1/7/86, ALZ 0042655; Weinberger Diary, 1/7/86, ALZ 0039883 ("Met with President, Shultz, Poindexter, Bill Casey, Ed Meese, in Oval Office -- President decided to go with Israeli-Iranian offer to release our 5 hostages in return for sale of 4000 TOWs to Iran by Israel -- George Shultz + I opposed -- Bill Casey, Ed Meese + VP favored -- as did Poindexter.").
67 Ibid., 1/14/86, ALZ 0039901 ("Colin Powell + Noel Cook [sic -- Koch] in office -- re changes in Iran offer on hostages -- ").
68 Koch, Select Committees Testimony, 6/23/87, pp. 76, 187-88 ("I said to him -- and I did not say it in a very serious way -- it may not sound in context as an opportunity for levity, but I said, do we have a legal problem with this, is somebody going to go to jail, and his response was in the affirmative. But I didn't take that seriously. . . . I hadn't intended it seriously when I asked the question. We had the shared background of Watergate to bounce some of these perceptions off of, so there was that. Chiefly I assumed if there was any prospect of it being illegal, that he would have stopped it. . . . [S]ince he didn't leave, I assumed it was legal.").
69 Weinberger Diary, 1/16/86, ALZ 0039906A ("Met with John Poindexter, McLaughlin -- re ways to increase aid + financing for Lebanon -- Bill Casey -- Ed Meese -- Stanley Sorkin [sic -- Sporkin]"); Sporkin, Select Committees Testimony, 6/24/87, pp. 126-28.
70 Weinberger Diary, 1/17/86, ALZ 0039906D ("Saw Colin Powell -- re acts prohibiting sales to Iran[;] Colin Powell (2) to Car -- citation to statute above[;] Lunch with Shultz, Bill Casey, John Poindexter in W.H. [White House] Family Dining Room, re attempts to get hostages back from Hizballah -- Told him of Statutes forbidding sales to Iran.").
71 Powell, FBI 302, 7/6/87 & 7/9/87, p. 1.
72 Weinberger Diary, 1/24/86, ALZ 0039919 ("Noel Koch -- in office -- with Colin Powell -- re Iranian-Hizbollah hostage release -- we are not to be involved in this beyond selling to CIA").
73 Weinberger Meeting Note, 2/11/86, ALZ 0040652D-52E.
74 Weinberger Diary, 3/4/86, ALZ 0040006B ("Attended lunch with John Poindexter -- in his WH [White House] office -- re Iran hostages. (About delays and demands -- McFarlane will go as rep. to meeting if they agree.)").
75 Ibid., 4/10/86, ALZ 0040065 ("Saw Don Jones -- re cables fm [from] Will Taft -- on addl [additional] attempts to buy our kidnappees' release -- with sp Hawk equipment -- "); Weinberger Diary, 4/13/86, ALZ 0040072 ("[Saw] Will Taft -- . . . also re sam Iran hostages -- McFarlane, North going to Iran -- idiocy -- ").
76 Ibid., 5/13/86, ALZ 0040147-48.
77 Ibid., 5/29/86, ALZ 0040165.
78 Ibid., 7/24/86, ALZ 0040303.
79 Ibid., 7/30/86, ALZ 0040312.
80 Ibid., 10/3/86, ALZ 0040458.
81 Jones, FBI 302, 3/24/92, pp. 2, 6.
82 Weinberger Diary, 5/13/86, ALZ 0040146-48; ibid., 10/30/86, ALZ 0040506.
83 Weinberger, FBI 302, 12/1/86; Weinberger, FBI 302, 4/7/88.
84 Shultz told Hill that "Cap takes notes but never referred to them so never had to cough them up." (Hill Note, 8/7/87, ALW 0056370.)
85 Weinberger, FBI 302, 4/7/88, p. 2.
86 The August 7, 1987, Charles Hill note.
87 The following account of the OIC's October 10, 1990, interview of Weinberger is based upon the FBI Record of Interview, also referred to as a "302."
88 At the beginning of the October 10, 1990, interview, Weinberger produced an October 1, 1990, memorandum by Kay D. Leisz, his executive assistant at that time and throughout his tenure at the DoD, regarding the OIC's request for Weinberger's notes. Leisz's memo echoed Weinberger's assertion that, other than notes he took in his briefing books during his first year as Secretary of Defense, no notes were retained. (Memorandum for the Record by Leisz, 10/1/90, ALZ 0051360.)
89 The August 7, 1987, Hill note.
90 Weinberger's counsel had asked to review the FBI report of the October 10, 1990, interview because of Weinberger's criticisms of the earlier FBI report.
91 Almost all high-level documents regarding the Iran arms sales and the Reagan Administration's efforts to obtain foreign support for the contras are highly classified.
92 In what may have been a misunderstanding, the OIC investigators did not believe they were at liberty to examine other parts of the index and therefore did not see the references to diary and meeting notes in the description of unclassified material.
93 The OIC immediately informed the Library of Congress and the Department of Defense of the security breach. After reviewing Weinberger's notes, the DoD determined that "classified information [had] inadvertently been included in the unclassified portion of the Weinberger collection at the Library of Congress" and recalled Weinberger's diary notes and activity logs to the Pentagon pending a formal security review. (Letter from Sterlacci to Stansbury, 6/12/92, 019316.)
94 During his interview with the Tower Commission, Weinberger lamented the fact that there were not "accurate minutes taken of all [NSC and NSPG] meetings." (Weinberger, Tower Commission Interview, 1/14/87, pp. 43-44.) He conceded that someone might have taken notes of the relevant meetings but said, "I don't know of any." (Ibid., p. 46.) Weinberger recommended strongly that accurate records be kept of such meetings in the future to show "who said what to whom and when." (Ibid., pp. 44, 46.)
95 In the course of the Weinberger investigation, the OIC requested and reviewed numerous DoD documents relating to the Iran arms sales and DoD's document-production efforts, and questioned more than 25 witnesses in interviews and in the Grand Jury. The central witnesses included Weinberger's personal secretaries at DoD, Kay D. Leisz and Thelma Stubbs Smith; former DoD General Counsel H. Lawrence Garrett III; former DoD Assistant General Counsel Edward J. Shapiro; former DoD officials Richard L. Armitage and William H. Taft IV; General Colin L. Powell; and Library of Congress personnel.
96 Independent Counsel recognized that Weinberger had a distinguished public career and that he had strongly opposed the Iran arms sales. OIC representatives met with Weinberger's attorneys on at least 12 separate occasions between April 1 and May 13, 1992. After Weinberger's counsel requested additional time to work with their client, Independent Counsel agreed not to present a proposed indictment to the special Iran/contra Grand Jury whose two-year term expired on May 15, 1992. Independent Counsel met with Weinberger's attorneys on June 2, 1992, to permit a final presentation by them. Subsequently an indictment was presented to and returned by a different Grand Jury.

The polygraph report concluded that no deception was indicated when Weinberger denied having intentionally misled or lied to Iran/contra investigators about his diary notes, denied having deliberately withheld his diary notes, and denied misleading investigators about his knowledge of arms transfers to Iran from August through November 1985. (Polygraph Examination Report, 5/5/92, ALZ 0046855-56.) The psychologist's report concluded that Weinberger's note-taking was so "routine, compulsive and habitual" that it was not "stored in memory for easy retrieval" and that the questioning of Weinberger "lacked sufficient specificity" to trigger a recollection of his notes. (Letter from Fishburne to Bennett, 6/1/92, pp. 3-4, ALZ 0047613-14.) Although Fishburne apparently reviewed Weinberger's congressional deposition, in which Weinberger was questioned about his note-taking (Ibid., p. 1), he did not review other evidence the Government would have used at trial to show Weinberger's consciousness of his notes.

The district court later ruled that neither the polygraph examination result nor expert testimony on memory could be admitted at trial. (Memorandum Opinion and Pretrial Order No. 15, United States v. Weinberger, Crim. No. 92-0235-TFH (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1992).)

98 Indictment, United States v. Caspar W. Weinberger, Criminal No. 92-0235-TFH (D.D.C. June 16, 1992).
99 Memorandum Opinion and Pretrial Order No. 6, United States v. Weinberger, Crim. No. 92-0235-TFH, pp. 4-5 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 1992).

951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992). The obstruction statute outlaws, among other things, "corruptly" "obstruct[ing]" or "imped[ing]" a congressional inquiry. (18 U.S.C. § 1505.) The Court of Appeals held in Poindexter that the term "corruptly" implies that a defendant must cause another knowingly to violate a legal duty and found that the term was therefore unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant charged with lying to Congress himself rather than causing another to do so. (951 F.2d at 379, 385-86.)

The OIC had argued that Poindexter did not preclude the obstruction charge against Weinberger because the indictment alleged that Weinberger had obstructed Congress not merely by lying but also by withholding and concealing his relevant notes. The Poindexter decision left open the possibility that concealing or destroying documents could be considered analogous to causing a witness to lie or withhold testimony and therefore would satisfy the court's interpretation of the term "corruptly." (Ibid. at 384, citing United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982)).

101 Indictment, United States v. Caspar W. Weinberger, Criminal No. 92-0416-TFH (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 1992). Weinberger had moved on August 3, 1992, to disqualify Deputy Independent Counsel Craig A. Gillen from trying the case on the ground that Gillen was a witness to Weinberger's October 10, 1990, interview. Gillen withdrew voluntarily from the case on October 9, 1992, following the District Court's preliminary ruling on this issue. Substitute trial counsel James J. Brosnahan was appointed on October 15, 1992. Brosnahan would have tried the case with Associate Counsel John Q. Barrett, George C. Harris, and Christina A. Spaulding.

Memorandum Opinion and Pretrial Order No. 12, United States v. Weinberger, Crim. No. 92-0235-TFH (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1992). Although the charged statement was beyond the five-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3288 provides that when a count is dismissed for "any reason" after the statute of limitations has run, the prosecution may bring a new indictment based upon the same facts within six months of the dismissal. To be proper under section 3288, the new indictment must be based on "essentially the same facts as those alleged in the old indictment" so that the defendant is on notice, within the statute of limitations, of the basis for the new charges. (Pretrial Order No. 12, at 4 quoting United States v. George, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9618 (D.D.C. July 8, 1992).)

The District Court acknowledged that, under this standard, Weinberger "clearly had notice of the factual basis for the charges" in the new indictment. (Ibid.) The court expressed "concern" that the specific statements alleged to be false had not been underlined in the first indictment but did not find this point dispositive. (Ibid., pp. 4, 6.) Rather, the court went on to hold that even though the new indictment was premised on the same facts as the first indictment, it impermissibly broadened the original charges because the obstruction statute, as construed in Poindexter, does not include false statements. (Ibid., pp. 5-6.)

103 In his testimony before congressional committees, Weinberger falsely claimed that he had been cut off "to a large extent" from this intelligence until shortly before December 7, 1985, when he first received one of these reports. (Weinberger, SSCI Testimony, 12/17/86, pp. 6-9, 51; Weinberger, HPSCI Testimony, 12/18/86, pp. 39-41; Weinberger, Select Committees Testimony, 7/31/87, pp. 92-94.)
104 Weinberger, FBI 302, 10/10/90. Weinberger later claimed that he believed the OIC was inquiring only about notes he took during meetings and therefore did not understand the questions to include his diary notes. (Weinberger Interview, ABC "This Week with David Brinkley," 12/27/92, NEXIS Tr. at 12). This explanation is disingenuous, because Weinberger stated in his October 10, 1990, interview that he very rarely took notes during meetings -- which was, in itself, false -- and also denied that he made any other record of meetings when he returned to his office or that he took notes of telephone conversations. In fact, Weinberger's diary notes consist primarily of notes of telephone conversations and of meetings, made after the fact.
105 Weinberger filed a motion in limine on December 14, 1992, seeking to prevent the Government from introducing at trial any evidence regarding the Select Committees' requests for Weinberger's notes and diaries. The Government opposed this motion on the ground that evidence that Weinberger had deliberately concealed his notes from Congress was admissible as intrinsic evidence of the falsity of his statements to the OIC and as extrinsic evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show Weinberger's motive to lie to the OIC. The district court had not yet ruled on the motion at the time of the pardon.
106 The term "diary notes" was adopted by the Library of Congress archivists to describe Weinberger's daily notes. Although Weinberger apparently referred to these documents as his "telephone logs," (Leisz, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, pp. 34-35), this report uses the Library of Congress terminology.
107 General Powell described Weinberger's note-taking in detail in an affidavit obtained by Weinberger's attorneys before the indictment. (Powell, Affidavit, 4/21/92, ¶¶ 3-4, ALZ 0045089.) Powell also stated that he regarded these notes as Weinberger's personal diaries and expressed the opinion that "it is entirely possible that it would not have occurred to [Weinberger] to associate or link these private notes on the 5 x 7 pads with a governmental request for 'notes' in the context of the Iran-Contra matter." (Ibid., ¶ 3.) On two separate occasions in 1987, however, Powell told congressional Iran/contra investigators that he had no knowledge of Weinberger maintaining a "diary." (Powell, Select Committees Interview Memorandum, 4/20/87, p. 9, AMY 000568; Powell, Select Committees Deposition, 6/19/87, pp. 54-55.) The inconsistencies in Powell's testimony are discussed below.
108 Jones, FBI 302, 12/22/92, p. 4. On one occasion, Jones noticed that Weinberger was taking notes of their conversation as they were talking. (Ibid.)

Smith, Affidavit, 4/29/92, ¶ 5, ALZ 0045122; Leisz, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, p. 35; Duncan, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, pp. 25-26; Taft, FBI 302, 4/8/92, p. 2; accord Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 17 (expressing hope to write later book covering on a "day-to-day basis" his seven years as secretary of defense).

Weinberger's 1981 diary notes contain repeated references to discussions with the British scholar and biographer Janet Morgan regarding his "biography + diaries." (Weinberger Diary, 3/16/81, ALZ 0060966; ibid., 3/17/81, ALZ 0060969; ibid., 3/27/81, ALZ 0060995; ibid., 3/30/81, ALZ 0061001; ibid., 4/4/81, ALZ 0061022; ibid., 4/9/81, ALZ 0061033; ibid., 10/24/81, ALZ 0061542.) Pentagon spokesperson Henry E. Catto, Jr. publicly identified Morgan in February 1982 as a prospective biographer of Weinberger. (DoD News Briefing, 2/2/82, pp. 1-2, ALZ 0070079-80.) Morgan denied in October 1992 that she had ever seen Weinberger's diary notes or discussed the notes with him as a possible basis for a biography or autobiography. (Morgan, FBI 302, 10/12/92, pp. 11-13; Morgan FBI 302, 10/14/92, pp. 2, 8. )

110 Weinberger signed the Manuscript Reading Room register on July 20, 1988. (AOZ 0000036.) Library call slips show that on the same day Duncan checked out boxes 580-85, which contain Weinberger's diary notes from his tenure as secretary of defense. (ALZ 0042861 (7-20-88, call slip); Memorandum from Teichroew to Wigdor, 12/22/92, AOZ 0000183-84 (explaining that 1980-87 diary notes were located in boxes 579-85 in 1988).)
111 Duncan, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, pp. 25-26, 34-35. Fighting for Peace nevertheless contains some references to Weinberger's notes. (See, for example, Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, pp. 96, 381.)
112 See, for example, Smith, Affidavit, 4/29/92, ¶ 7, ALZ 0045122-23.
113 Following the summary of a meeting in his diary notes, Weinberger would sometimes cross-reference his meeting notes by indicating parenthetically "see separate memo." (Weinberger Diary, 9/28/84, ALZ 0063118; ibid., 6/24/85, ALZ 0039500; ibid., 10/27/86, ALZ 0040497; ibid., 11/10/86, ALZ 0040525; ibid., 11/12/86, ALZ 0040531; ibid., 11/25/86, ALZ 0040562; ibid., 9/15/87, ALZ 0046894.) These references further demonstrate Weinberger's consciousness of his notes.
114 Both the House and Senate Select Committees considered contemporaneous notes to be particularly important to their investigation of Iran/contra. In a statement appended to the Select Committees' report on the Iran/contra investigation, Senators Inouye and Rudman -- the Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively, of the Senate Select Committee -- praised President Reagan for making excerpts of his personal diaries available to the Select Committees and for instructing other executive branch officials similarly to make all of their relevant records available. Rudman and Inouye noted that administration officials had been asked to disclose personal documents and remarked that "[t]hose of us who keep diaries appreciate the intensely personal and private nature of the entries we make in such books, confiding our innermost concerns, aspirations and thoughts." (Majority Report, p. 637.)
115 Weinberger, Select Committees Interview Memorandum, 3/11/87, p. 2, AMY 00205.
116 Ibid., pp. 4-5, AMY 00207-8. Weinberger repeated his Kissinger analogy when asked again about notes during his June 17, 1987, congressional deposition. (Weinberger, Select Committees Deposition, 6/17/87, p. 79.)
117 Weinberger, Select Committees Interview Memorandum, 3/11/87, p. 5, AMY 00208.
118 Weinberger Diary, 3/11/87, ALZ 0042242.
119 Letter from Belnick to Shapiro, 4/4/87, ALZ 0041455-64; Letter from Naughton to Shapiro, 4/13/87, ALT 0001378-79.
120 Memorandum from Garrett to Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) [Ikle], Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) [Armitage], Assistant General Counsels (OSD), Assistants to the Secretary of Defense, et al., 4/14/87, p. 1, ALZ 0047336-51. Documents were stamped "SEC DEF HAS SEEN," with the date, after Weinberger's secretary removed them from the out box on his desk. (Leisz, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, p. 8.)
121 Action Memorandum from Garrett to Weinberger Re: Document Request from Congressional Select Committee on Iran, 4/17/87, ALZ 0064947-48.
122 Ibid. The Garrett memorandum was stamped "SEC DEF HAS SEEN" on June 17, 1987, indicating that Weinberger placed the document in his out box on the same day that he stated falsely in his congressional deposition that he rarely took notes.
123 Garrett's April 17, 1987, memorandum contradicts his 1992 affidavit, which asserted that he did not discuss with Weinberger "the specific details" of any Iran/contra document request and did not ask Weinberger "about the existence of personal notes or diaries." (Garrett, Affidavit, 4/28/92, ¶¶ 7, 11, ALZ 0045034-36.) Similarly, although Weinberger's senior military assistant at that time, Gen. Gordon Fornell, asserted in an affidavit that he was "unaware of anyone ever asking Secretary Weinberger to produce his informal jottings to any body investigating the Iran-contra affair," Fornell later identified his handwritten initial "F" in the margin of Garrett's April 17, 1987, memorandum to Weinberger, next to the paragraph noting that the House Select Committee "has requested all . . . diaries . . . and handwritten notes kept by you" relating to various topics, including Iran. (Compare Fornell, Affidavit, 4/24/92, ¶ 6, ALZ 0045025-26, with Fornell, Grand Jury, 10/28/92, p. 31.)
124 Weinberger, CNN Interview, 12/28/92, NEXIS Transcript p. 6; Weinberger, Fox Morning News Interview, 12/29/92, NEXIS Transcript p. 2.
125 President Reagan's agreement to allow congressional investigators limited access to his personal diaries was also widely publicized. It also was widely known, at least by the time the congressional hearings were underway, that other Administration officials, including Shultz's executive assistant Charles Hill, had produced some of their relevant, personal notes to congressional investigators.
126 Weinberger Diary, 4/21/87, ALZ 0042343. Weinberger's attorneys claimed that this note actually reads "demand for my choices" and refers not to Iran/contra but to some unspecified matter regarding "black programs" that may have been pending before the Senate and House intelligence committees in April 1987. They submitted a report from a private handwriting expert who concluded that it was "highly probable" that the disputed word was "choices." (Document Examination Report, 5/27/92, ALZ 0047624.) The OIC would have established at trial, based on comparisons to other samples of Weinberger's handwriting, that the disputed word is "diary." The "black programs" mentioned in Weinberger's note refers to an April 1, 1987, request from the staff of the Senate Select Committee for briefings on limited access ("black") programs. (Letter from Saxon to Shapiro, 4/1/87, ALZ 0054812.)
127 General Counsels' Coordinating Group Meeting Minutes, 4/29/87, ALU 140159-64.
128 Memorandum from Garrett to Taft Re: Congressional Request for Excerpts of Relevant Portions of the Diaries of the SecDef, 4/29/87, ALZ 0058007.
129 Taft, FBI 302, 4/8/92, p. 2; Taft, Grand Jury, 10/28/92, pp. 27-29. Taft said he also advised Garrett that Smith and Leisz would know if Weinberger kept notes. (Taft, FBI 302, 4/8/92, p. 2.) Garrett recalled a conversation in which he told Smith and Leisz that the document requests included personal notes and he was told that Weinberger had no notes. (Garrett, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, pp. 18-19.) Garrett purported not to recall such a conversation with Taft, however.
130 Weinberger Diary, 4/30/87, ALZ 0042366.

Memorandum from Belnick to the File, 5/1/87, AMY 000361 (emphasis added). The House Select Committee continued separately to pursue Weinberger's notes and diaries. On May 22, 1987, Joseph H. Saba, staff counsel to the House Select Committee, wrote to Garrett, noting that the House Committee had received few documents from Weinberger and asking for Weinberger's "diaries, appointment books, records of meetings, and handwritten notes. . . ." The letter further advised that the request "is inclusive of [Weinberger's] personal diary entries made from October 1984 through 1987, pertaining to the Boland Amendment, Iran, Nicaragua, and the Contras." (Letter from Saba to Garrett, 5/22/87, ALZ 0054598-600.)

On June 10, 1987, Saba wrote again to Shapiro, reiterating the House Committee's request for access to Weinberger's calendars and diaries, "and all other schedule-type records of the occurrence of meetings, events, and telephone conversations for the period July 1, 1985, through December 31, 1986." (Letter from Saba to Shapiro, 6/10/87, ALZ 0058754.) According to Weinberger's own diary notes, Gen. Fornell consulted him on June 15, 1987, two days before Weinberger's deposition, about "data on my calendar to be turned over to Jt. Iran Committee[.]" (Weinberger Diary, 6/15/87, ALZ 0042472.) The next day, Weinberger's official calendars and activity logs, but none of his diary or meeting notes, were produced to the House Select Committee. (Letter from Shapiro to Saxon, 6/18/87, ALZ 0055135-36 (enclosing documents produced to House Select Committee on 6/16/87 and memorandum describing documents)).


Weinberger, Select Committees Deposition, 6/17/87, pp. 79-80. Ironically, given Weinberger's subsequent contention that he did not understand his "jottings" to be within the scope of congressional requests for "notes," (Weinberger, CNN Interview, 12/28/92, NEXIS Transcript p. 6), the following exchange occurred during Weinberger's congressional deposition:

Q: Do you ever take notes that are not dictated or make jottings when you get back [from meetings]?

A: Yes, occasionally, but comparatively rarely. I don't know that we kept those in any formal way. I don't think they have been filed or labeled. . . .

Q: If there is any chance there are ----

A: I think we made this examination and whatever there is is in our so-called C&D, correspondence and directives. They have been asked to paw through everything.

Weinberger, Select Committees Deposition, 6/17/87, pp. 79-80. (emphasis added).) As discussed further below, the Government would have shown at trial that Weinberger was well aware that hundreds of pages of his diary notes and scores of pages of his meeting notes were stored in his desk and office bedroom and were not in the C&D files.

133 Weinberger Diary, 6/17/87, ALZ 0042476.
134 Memorandum from Garrett to Weinberger Re: Document Request from congressional Select Committee on Iran, 4/17/87, ALZ 0064947 (stamped "SEC DEF HAS SEEN JUN 17, 1987").
135 Sandler, FBI 302, 7/28/92, p. 3.
136 Receipt for 99 Unclassified Boxes of Secretary Weinberger's Personal Papers, 4/5/88, attaching Index of 14 Miscellaneous Boxes, including "Telephone Logs 1980; 1981-87," (Grand Jury Exhibit No. 326, 5/8/92.)
137 The index of 14 miscellaneous boxes included in the April 1988 accession also listed one box of "Blank Note Pads; Notes from Meetings." (Ibid.)

The following evidence indicates that Weinberger maintained the set A notes himself, separately from his secretaries' handwritten notes file: (1) none of the notes is stamped "SecDef Has Seen," indicating that they were never placed in his out box; (2) according to the Library of Congress archivist, these notes were bundled together under handwritten cover notes by Weinberger (ALZ 0040718-19) identifying them as miscellaneous notes of Cabinet and NSC meetings (Teichroew, OIC Deposition, 4/21/92, p. 37); and (3) the notes were not labeled or dated by anyone other than Weinberger. (Compare description of set B notes below.) Like the diary notes, the set A meeting notes are all originals and have no classification markings, even though they contain classified information.

The set A notes contain Weinberger's notes of the most significant Iran/contra meetings, including the December 10, 1985, White House meeting at which arms sales to Iran were discussed, the January 6 and 7, 1986, meetings on the Iran arms sales, a February 11, 1986, "Family Group" lunch meeting at which a schedule of arms transfers and hostage releases was outlined and the November 24, 1986, NSPG meeting regarding the Administration's response to public disclosure of the arms sales.

139 There is no overlap between the set A and set B meeting notes.
140 ALZ 0040721 (3 pages) (index to 1985 set B meeting notes); ALZ 0040722 (3 pages) (index to 1986 set B meeting notes); ALZ 0040723 (3 pages) (1985 index showing classified items removed); ALZ 0040766 (1986 index showing classified items removed). The August 1988 Library of Congress accession included the "SecDef's Personal Library Vaulted Files (1981-87) and Complete Index." (ALZ 0042825 (8/9/88) (receipt for classified material).)
141 Smith, Affidavit, 4/29/92, ¶¶ 7, 8, 10, ALZ 0045122-24. Smith suggested that the meeting notes listed on the index of 14 miscellaneous boxes included in the April 1988 Library of Congress accession (which contained the set A notes) were from the handwritten notes file in the office vault. (Ibid., ¶ 8.) The circumstantial evidence demonstrates, however, that the set B notes, rather than the set A notes, correspond to the handwritten notes file that Smith recalls packing: (1) only the set B notes were labeled by the secretaries; (2) only the set B notes contain documents stamped "SEC DEF HAS SEEN," indicating that Smith or Leisz had originally retrieved them from Weinberger's out box; and (3) the set B notes include a cover note by Leisz, attaching a set of notes on the TWA hijacking (ALZ 0060091) and a cover note by Powell to Leisz, attaching another set of notes "for your file" (ALZ 0060174).
142 Lt. Col. Andrew Krepinevich, who worked in the Executive Secretariat in 1987-88, recalled receiving one or more boxes of material from Weinberger's vault, including a significant number of his handwritten meeting notes, to be processed for transfer to the Library. (Krepinevich, FBI 302, 3/16/92, pp. 2-3.) Krepinevich's description of these notes dovetails with Smith's description of the notes she packed, and the indices that accompanied the set B notes are identical to other indices generated by the Executive Secretariat. Although the OIC was not able to confirm the location of the original notes, Krepinevich said they would have been sent to storage at the National Archives and Records Administration's Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. (Ibid., p. 3.)
143 Weinberger, Select Committees Deposition, 6/17/87, p. 80. The indices prepared by DoD list individual documents with their C&D-assigned number, which has an X prefix; documents that do not have a C&D number have a blank space next to the X prefix. (See, e.g., DoD 1985 Subject Index A-I, ALZ 0043111-233.) None of the 1985 and 1986 set B meeting notes has a C&D number. ALZ 0040721 (3 pages) (index to 1985 set B meeting notes); ALZ 0040722 (3 pages) (index to 1986 set B meeting notes).
144 Agreement of Deposit, 8/7/87, ALZ 0040904-6.
145 Weinberger, Press Conference, 12/24/92, NEXIS Transcript, p. 39.
146 General Accounting Office, Federal Records -- Document Removal by Agency Heads Needs Independent Oversight, August 1991, pp. 23-25.
147 See, e.g. Weinberger NSPG Meeting Notes, 11/24/86, ALZ 0040669 (20 pages).
148 See, e.g., Majority Report, pp. 15-16, 38-39, 44-47, 63, 69-71, 120-21.
149 Weinberger, Select Committees Deposition, 6/17/87, p. 74.
150 Weinberger Diary, 1/6/84, ALZ 0062780; ibid., 5/21/84, ALZ 0062949; ibid., 6/27/84, ALZ 0063000; ibid., 8/17/84, ALZ 0063062; ibid., 10/9/84, ALZ 0063133; ibid., 11/2/84, ALZ 0063161; ibid., 1/10/85, ALZ 0039233; ibid., 5/1/85, ALZ 0039404; ibid., 6/18/85, ALZ 0039488; ibid., 9/11/85, ALZ 0039648; ibid., 6/2/86, ALZ 0040174; ibid., 10/31/86, ALZ 0040508; ibid., 11/23/86, ALZ 0040556; ibid., 2/9/87, ALZ 0042167; ibid., 6/30/87, ALZ 0042496.
151 Ibid., 2/6/84, ALZ 0062819; ibid., 2/9/84, ALZ 0062826; ibid., 5/20/84, ALZ 0062948; ibid., 6/5/84, ALZ 0062969; ibid., 10/8/84, ALZ 0063131; ibid., 11/5/84, ALZ 0063166; ibid., 7/29/85, ALZ 0039565; ibid., 10/9/85, ALZ 0039713A; ibid., 1/8/86, ALZ 0039887; ibid., 5/15/86, ALZ 0040157; ibid., 6/23/86, ALZ 0040228; ibid., 6/27/86, ALZ 0040243; ibid., 1/6/87, ALZ 0042084; ibid., 5/20/87, ALZ 0042416; ibid., 6/11/87, ALZ 0042462; ibid., 7/23/87, ALZ 0042551; ibid., 7/24/87, ALZ 0042555; ibid., 8/2/87, ALZ 0042574.
152 Ibid., 1/31/84, ALZ 0062811; ibid., 5/6/84, ALZ 0062935; ibid., 9/24/84, ALZ 0063111; ibid., 1/20/85, ALZ 0039248; ibid., 2/13/85, ALZ 0039276; ibid., 12/10/85, ALZ 0039842; ibid., 2/5/86, ALZ 0039948; ibid., 3/4/86, ALZ 0040006D; ibid., 7/1/86, ALZ 0040254; ibid., 4/3/87, ALZ 0042295; ibid., 7/26/87, ALZ 0042559.
153 Ibid., 7/11/87, ALZ 0042520.

For example, as the Iran/contra scandal was breaking publicly, Weinberger's diary contains these notes regarding his private meeting with Prince Bandar on Sunday, November 23, 1986:

Prince Bandar in office -- Nancy Reagan --
in a 1 1/2 hr. talk Friday with him -- he invited President to dinner at his Embassy -- sd [said] she thinks Shultz should go -- that he has been disloyal to the President -- he sd he recommended to her that I be named Secretary of State; that I could negotiate an agreement with Soviets because no one could say I was soft on them -- She feels that very few are being loyal to President + that Shultz should not have gone to Canada Friday + should support President -- She would like Baker to go in as Secretary of Defense!

(Ibid., 11/23/86, ALZ 0040556.)

155 E.g., 5/25/84, ALZ 0062956-57; ibid., 1/8/86, ALZ 0039887; ibid., 5/15/86, ALZ 0040157; ibid., 6/2/86, ALZ 0040174; ibid., 2/9/87, ALZ 0042167; ibid., 6/30/87, ALZ 0042496; ibid., 9/2/87, ALZ 0046865; ibid., 9/26/87, ALZ 0046921.
156 Weinberger's diary does not indicate, however, that he had any awareness of the contra resupply network in Central America or its connection to Oliver North during 1985 and 1986.

Press Release from Bandar, 10/21/86, ALW 0063258. In 1987, Prince Bandar refused Independent Counsel's request for a personal interview and declined to provide answers to Independent Counsel's interrogatories regarding financial support for the contras. (Letter from Bandar to Shultz, 5/1/87, ALW 0063255-57.) In his letter to Secretary of State Shultz communicating this refusal to cooperate, Prince Bandar said that Saudi Arabia's "confidences and commitments, like our friendship, are given for not just the moment but the long run." (Ibid.) Prince Bandar also attached a copy of his October 21, 1986, public statement regarding the contras and asserted that "it would not be appropriate or constructive in a diplomatic or other sense to elaborate further on that clear position." (Ibid.) To Independent Counsel's knowledge, no official representative of the Saudi Kingdom ever admitted publicly that it provided money to the contras during 1984 and 1985.

158 For a more complete discussion of third-country funding for the contras, see McFarlane chapter.
159 E.g. McFarlane, FBI 302, 4/15/87 (morning session), p. 3 (placing Bandar's announcement in "June 1984"); McFarlane, Select Committees Testimony, 5/11/87, pp. 34-36.
160 Weinberger Diary, 5/20/84, ALZ 0062948.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid., 5/22/84, ALZ 0062950.
163 Charles Hill, the executive assistant to Secretary of State Shultz, took detailed notes during this meeting. Hill's notes indicate that the meeting was attended by Shultz, Weinberger, IkleAE1, Kirkpatrick, Casey, McMahon, McFarlane, Poindexter and North, among others, and that Shultz, Weinberger, Kirkpatrick and McFarlane had a private meeting after the larger meeting had ended. (Hill Notes, 6/20/84, ANS 0000679-81.)
164 Ibid., 6/20/84, ANS 0000680 (emphasis in original). Weinberger's corresponding diary entry is the following: "Attended meeting w/ Shultz, Jeane Kirkpatrick -- Bill Casey, Bud McFarlane[,] Ikle -- at State -- re funding for Nicaragua -- urged that we tell the Senate to stand fast on their vote despite Speaker's refusal to go along with George's requests for less. + then try to get the best we can in conference." (Weinberger Diary, 6/20/84, ALZ 0062989.)
165 Ibid., 3/13/85, ALZ 0039320B-C.
166 Ibid., 3/14/85, ALZ 0039323.
167 Memorandum for the Record from McMahon, 3/15/85, ER 26,187-88 & ER 92-00116-17.
168 Vessey, FBI 302, 6/11/92, pp. 6-7; accord Vessey, Select Committees Deposition, 4/17/87, pp. 5-8 (testimony regarding one occasion when Bandar told Vessey, who then reported to Weinberger, of a contribution to the contras).
169 Vessey, FBI 302, 6/11/92, p. 7; Vessey, FBI 302, 2/11/87, p. 1.
170 Vessey, FBI 302, 6/11/92, p. 7; cf. Vessey, Select Committees Deposition, 4/17/87, pp. 8-9 (". . . . I have wracked my mind trying to think of a conversation with McFarlane. And it seems to me that at one time we came out of a National Security Council or National Security Planning Group meeting in the NSC wing of the White House, and that some conversation with McFarlane took place about the Saudis, about them helping the contras. But I don't recall the substance of it or anything other than it being sort of a casual thing as we went out."). Although General Vessey stated in 1992 that this incident at the White House had occurred after Prince Bandar had informed him for the second time that the Saudis were funding the contras, Vessey also recalled that the subject of his and Weinberger's meeting with McFarlane was a specific classified proposal involving arms sales to the Saudis. (Vessey, FBI 302, 6/11/92, p. 7; see also Classified Appendix.) Based upon Vessey's recollection of the subject matter, contemporaneous records indicate that this conversation occurred on the morning of May 25, 1984, when Vessey accompanied Weinberger to a White House meeting on this subject. (Weinberger Diary, 5/25/84, ALZ 0062956 ("Jack Vessey in office -- wants to go to meeting with President -- also re [Classified Arms Sale Proposal] . . . Attended Meeting in Oval Office -- with President, Bud McFarlane, Shultz, Vice President, Shultz, Ed Meese, Baker -- [specific classified weapons systems] OK for Saudi -- ").)
171 McMahon, FBI 302, 5/23/88, p. 4.
172 McFarlane, Select Committees Testimony, 5/11/87, pp. 38-39; accord generally McFarlane, FBI 302, 4/15/87 (morning session), pp. 3-5; McFarlane, Select Committees Testimony, 5/12/87, p. 133. This probably occurred on May 24, 1984. Weinberger's diary notes indicate that he, McFarlane and Shultz discussed a classified arms sale proposal to Saudi Arabia that was pending at that time. (Weinberger Diary, 5/24/84, ALZ 0062955 ("Breakfast with Bud McFarlane, Shultz, Rich Armitage -- etc -- at State -- re [Classified Arms Sale Proposal] for Saudi"); see also Classified Appendix.) Other evidence indicates that Prince Bandar made his decision to support the contras in the second half of May 1984.
173 McFarlane, FBI 302, 3/10/87, p. 10; McFarlane, FBI 302, 4/15/87 (morning session), p. 5; accord Weinberger Diary, 3/13/85, ALZ 0039320C.
174 Ibid., 1/14/87, ALZ 0042107.
175 Vessey, FBI 302, 6/11/92, p. 8.

Weinberger Diary, 2/11/87, ALZ 0042173. Less than three weeks after this meeting with Vessey and their discussion of the information they had received in 1985 regarding Saudi assistance to the contras, Weinberger made a curious diary entry:

Jack Vessey -- re reference to Tower Report to Saudis helping contras -- neither of us know anything about that

(Ibid., 2/27/87, ALZ 0042210.) Weinberger's note appears to refer to McFarlane's written statement, which is quoted in the Tower Commission Report issued the previous day, that he "was separately informed by the Secretary of Defense and General Vessey that the total amount of the contribution [by a "foreign official" (Prince Bandar) to the contras] during 1985 was 25 million." (Report of the President's Special Review Board, 2/26/87, p. C-5.)

When Vessey was confronted with Weinberger's note in 1992, he said that he had no idea what it referred to and denied that he and Weinberger ever agreed to cover up their knowledge of the Saudi contribution. (Vessey, FBI 302, 6/11/92, p. 9.) Vessey also pointed out that he would not have told Weinberger on February 27, 1987, that he (Vessey) had no knowledge of the Saudi contribution because he had told the FBI, and then Weinberger, exactly the opposite only a few weeks earlier. (Ibid.)

177 Letter from Weinberger to Fascell, 9/4/86, ALZ 012492. The press report that prompted Fascell's letter alleged that a slush fund, built into the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) sale to Saudi Arabia, provided funds for the contras. (Ibid.)
178 Weinberger, SSCI Testimony, 12/17/86, pp. 67-68.
179 At Weinberger's trial, evidence of this false testimony would have been admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and on other bases to show the motive and intent for his later lies on the same topic.
180 Weinberger, Select Committees Testimony, 7/31/87, pp. 133-35. Although Weinberger's attorneys later claimed that this testimony showed that Weinberger did not deny making the statement recorded in McMahon's contemporaneous memorandum, the full transcript demonstrates Weinberger's calculated denial that he knew anything about Saudi assistance to the contras. The core of the testimony was Weinberger's statement that he was "quite sure" that no one had advised him of the Saudi contribution to the contras. The OIC verified the exact phrasing of the questions and Weinberger's answers throughout his testimony from videotape recordings of the Select Committee proceedings.
181 Weinberger Diary, 11/9/85, ALZ 0039774.
182 Ibid., 11/10/85, ALZ 0039775.
183 Ibid., 11/19/85, ALZ 0039795.
184 Powell, FBI 302, 2/24/92, pp. 7-8.
185 Weinberger Diary, 11/19/85, ALZ 0039797.

Ibid. Powell later explained, after reviewing this note by Weinberger, that

[t]his is Mr. Weinberger's way of expressing his frustration in dealing with Mr. McFarlane. Mr. McFarlane had a habit of concluding conversations with the statement, "Thanks for the call." It was also a way of dismissing any concerns that might have been expressed in the call.

So whereas Mr. Weinberger was calling back to Mr. McFarlane to tell him this is illegal, it's a bad idea, you shouldn't be doing this, he was getting back from Mr. McFarlane something along the lines, "Thanks for the call," rather than "I agree" or "I don't agree." It was just "Thanks for the call."

So Mr. Weinberger is expressing his anxiety and frustration here that he has given information that should kill this idea right in its crib and instead of getting agreement, he's getting once again a "Thanks for the call" answer.

I am confident that this way of entering it in his personal notes was a way of expressing his annoyance and frustration that he did not succeed in killing this or he didn't know if he succeeded in killing this.

(Powell, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, p. 62.)

187 Weinberger Diary, 11/20/85, ALZ 0039799.
188 Ibid., 11/20/85, ALZ 0039801.
189 Ibid., 11/21/85, ALZ 0039802-03.
190 Ibid., 11/23/85, ALZ 0039806A. This diary note and the subsequent November 25, 1985, diary note showing that Weinberger was watching for a hostage release at the time contradict his assertion, offered for the first time after he was pardoned, that he did not believe McFarlane's statements to him and thus did not "know" that a shipment of HAWK missiles was to take place.
191 Ibid., 11/25/85, ALZ 0039808.
192 In his statements to various Iran/contra investigators, Weinberger adamantly denied receiving actual copies of these intelligence reports regarding arms-for-hostages transactions with Iran during 1985-86. (E.g. Weinberger, FBI 302, 12/3/90, p. 3.) Weinberger's statements were contradicted by numerous witnesses, including Powell and Armitage. Independent Counsel was unable to prosecute Weinberger for these false statements because the Executive Branch would not have declassified even Weinberger's statements for inclusion in a proposed indictment, much less the underlying documentary evidence and testimony that would have been necessary to prove the case.
193 Weinberger, Select Committees Testimony, 7/31/87, p. 99. As published by the Select Committees, the transcript of Weinberger's testimony erroneously reports the question quoted in the text above as, "Do you know that replenishment was an issue?"

For example, during his December 17, 1986, testimony in closed session before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Weinberger gave the following answer to a question from Senator Cohen:

Q: So to the best of your recollection there was no discussion about the Israelis transferring arms and us possibly resupplying them?

A: Not in my presence; no. I heard about that only much later after these things started to come out and as I say I heard -- only heard that statements were being made, not that that had actually happened.

(Weinberger, SSCI Testimony, 12/17/86, p. 58.) This answer was not the subject of prosecution because the statute of limitations had run before the OIC obtained Weinberger's notes.

195 McFarlane, FBI 302, 3/20/92, pp. 5-7; ibid., 12/3/86, pp. 2-3.
196 Ibid., 3/20/92, pp. 3, 5-6, 9; ibid., 3/13/87, p. 4; ibid., 12/3/86, pp. 2-3.
197 Ibid., 3/20/92, pp. 19-22; ibid., 3/31/92, pp. 2-3, 5.
198 Weinberger Diary, 11/19/85, ALZ 0039795.
199 E.g. McFarlane, FBI 302, 3/20/92, pp. 19-22; McFarlane, FBI 302, 3/31/92, p. 3. Shultz, who also attended, told his aides after the meeting that McFarlane and Poindexter had reported that "Isr [Israel] sent 60 I-hawks for [the] release of Weir" in September 1985. (Hill Note, 12/7/85, ANS 0001242.)
200 Weinberger Meeting Notes, 12/10/85, ALZ 0040644B-45B.
201 Other phrases -- the prediction that, if the United States stood away from Iran, the Israelis would "go on" delivering weapons, and the statement that dealing with Iran directly would require the United States to "give up" Israeli cover -- also show Weinberger was informed of past missile shipments from Israel to Iran.
202 Koch, FBI 302, 4/2/92, pp. 9-10.
203 E.g. Powell, Select Committees Deposition, 6/19/87, pp. 80-81.
204 Powell, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, pp. 93-97; accord generally Powell, FBI Interview Transcript, 12/5/86, ALZ 0047715 ("every step along the way I kept the Secretary [Weinberger] informed as to the progress of this activity"); Powell, OIC Interview Transcript, 11/5/92, pp. 13, 24-25, ALZ 0075329-30 ("I'm sure I discussed it [replenishment] with him [Weinberger]. . . . The only thing I have a recollection of is at some point the issue of replenishment came up and I'm quite confident I had [a] fairly good memory of having made him aware of it. . . . I'm sure that we discussed the fact at that time that there was a replenishment issue or replenishment problem associated with this deal and it had to be dealt with.").
205 Powell, FBI 302, 2/24/92, p. 2.
206 E.g. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
207 On December 9, 1986, prior to Independent Counsel's appointment, the FBI advised the White House, in response to its request for information, that Powell had been interviewed as a witness and was not considered a subject of investigation. (Letter from Clarke to Wallison, 12/9/86 ALU 010963; cf. Weinberger Diary, 12/10/86, ALZ 0040584 ("Saw Frank Carlucci -- . . . Also Frank wants me to call Peter Wallison WH Counsel -- to tell them Colin had no connection with Iran arms sales -- except to carry out President's order. . . . Called Peter Wallison -- Told him Colin Powell had only minimum involvement on Iran").)
208 Powell's statements to congressional investigators in 1987 regarding Weinberger's notes and diary are addressed below in a separate section.
209 Armitage, Grand Jury, 4/29/92, p. 7. In May 1986, Armitage also assumed responsibility for counterterrorism policy, including security assistance, counterintelligence and special forces operations. (Ibid., p. 7.)
210 Armitage typically would see Weinberger every day, and sometimes as often as three to four times a day. (Ibid., p. 9.)
211 Armitage readily admitted that he was "a terrible gossip" and trader of information throughout the Government regarding political, bureaucratic and policy developments. (Ibid., p. 22; accord Armitage, Select Committees Deposition, 7/22/87, p. 145).
212 This section of the report focuses only on Armitage's knowledge and testimony regarding the Iran arms sales. Armitage also acquired direct knowledge of North's contra-support activities. See Abrams chapter.
213 Armitage, SSCI Testimony, 12/11/86, pp. 58, 70; Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, pp. 14-15, 33; Armitage, DAIG Interview, 12/24/86, p. 8.
214 Armitage, SSCI Testimony, 12/11/86, p. 43. Armitage subsequently recalled hearing the rumor that the HAWK missiles that went from Israel to Iran were rejected "because they had the Star of David on them." (Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, p. 32.) He also stated that this information may have been contained in an intelligence report. (Armitage, FBI 302, 1/31/91, pp. 1, 6.)
215 Armitage, SSCI Testimony, 12/11/86, p. 43.
216 On Monday, December 2, they met at 3 p.m. in Armitage's office. (Armitage Meeting Log, 12/2/85, ALZ 016436.) The next day, after Armitage had lunch with North to discuss his activities relating to Iran, Meron returned to Armitage's office for a late afternoon meeting. (Armitage Meeting Log, 12/3/85, ALZ 016437.) On December 5, Meron called Armitage on the phone. (Armitage Telephone Log, 12/5/85, ALZ 015341.)
217 Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, p. 29.
218 Armitage, Select Committees Deposition, 5/26/87, pp. 32-33, 118-19. Armitage agreed that he thought he would remember if he had discussed the replenishment issue with Meron. (Ibid., p. 33.)
219 Armitage Meeting Log, 12/3/85, ALZ 016437 ("1230-1345 Ollie North -- Lunch in office"). North's meeting immediately prior to the Armitage lunch was a meeting with Secord at 11:30 a.m. in North's office. (North Appointment Calendar, 12/3/85, AKW 003914.)
220 Armitage, FBI 302, 12/10/86, p. 4.
221 Ibid., p. 4. In his congressional testimony the next day, Armitage stated that Weinberger, after reading intelligence reports suggesting that Iranians were contacting U.S. officials through the White House switchboard, had assigned him to find out which officials were talking to the Iranians. (Armitage, SSCI Testimony, 12/11/86, pp. 5, 40.) The next week in his Tower Commission interview, Armitage gave a more active description of Weinberger's role: "the Secretary [Weinberger] had shown me [intelligence] that indicated somebody in the White House, quote, unquote, was meeting with Iranians." (Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, p. 4.)
222 Armitage, FBI 302, 12/10/86, p. 4; accord Armitage, SSCI Testimony, 12/11/86, pp. 5, 12-13, 41; Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, pp. 4-5.
223 Armitage, FBI 302, 12/10/86, p. 4; accord Armitage, SSCI Testimony, 12/11/86, pp. 5-7; Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, pp. 4-5 ("I said to him [North], I don't think my boss knows anything about this. I doubt that Secretary of State Shultz knows anything about [this]. I think your ass is way out on a limb and you best get all the elephants together to discuss this issue.")
224 Ibid., p. 5.
225 Armitage Meeting Log, 12/5/85, ALZ 016439 ("1300 -- Gen Secord"); ibid., 12/27/85, ALZ 016457 (2:50 p.m.).
226 Armitage, FBI 302, 12/10/86, p. 4; accord Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, p. 27.
227 Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, p. 26.
228 Armitage, Select Committees Deposition, 5/26/87, pp. 65-67; accord ibid., pp. 83-84.
229 North Note, 11/18/86, AMX 001696.
230 Memorandum by North, "Special Project Re Iran," 12/5/85, ALZ 0041745-52.
231 Secord, FBI 302, 3/11/92, p. 8.
232 North Note, 11/26/85, AMX 001911. Secord recalled reporting this information to North. (Secord, FBI 302, 3/11/92, p. 8.)
233 North Note, 12/2/85, AMX 001920 ("Mtg [Meeting] w/ Moron [sic]") (final entry of the day).
234 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73.
235 Intelligence Report, 10/2/85, AMW 0001955-57; accord Weinberger Diary, 10/3/85, ALZ 0039703.
236 Weinberger Diary, 10/4/85, ALZ 0039704 ("Breakfast with Bill Casey + John McMahon + Will Taft -- re Israeli bombing of Tunis -- + UN resolution; Ollie North's negot. with Iranians -- Told them no US arms to be sold or given to Iran.").
237 State of Israel, The Iranian Transactions -- A Historical Chronology, Part One, 7/29/87, p. 54, AOW 0000067, as released in Majority Report, pp. 194, 210 n. 11.

Armitage Telephone Log, 12/3/85, ALZ 015337 (Armitage called and spoke to Raphel at 2:05 p.m.). Raphel's handwritten notes contain the following:

-- Ollie
-- Scapegoat if it goes wrong
-- Iranians are sleazeballs
-- Ollie -- we've lost little
-- Bud should get them all together + brief --

(Raphel Note, 12/3/85, ALW 0062382.) Ralphel's 1987 typed narration of his notes identified Armitage as the source of Raphel's information:

December 3 -- Assistant Secretary Armitage told me that Col. North had said that he would be made the scapegoat if the operation goes wrong, but that we have lost little by trying. Reportedly, Col. North added that the Iranians involved are disreputable. Mr. Armitage said he suggested to Col. North that Mr. McFarlane should get all the principals together to brief on the operation.

(Raphel Chronology, 1987, p. 2, ALW 0056727.)

239 Armitage Telephone Log, 12/3/85, ALZ 015337 (Armitage takes incoming call from Powell at 12:45 p.m.).
240 Powell, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, pp. 84-85.
241 Raphel Note, 12/5/85, ALW 0062388. Although Raphel spoke to Armitage on a daily basis, he was not questioned about this note because Independent Counsel did not acquire it until after Raphel's death in 1988.
242 North Appointment Calendars, 12/2/85 & 12/3/85, AKW 003914; Memorandum for the Record by Secord, "Meeting with O. North in OEB, 4 Dec @ 1930," AQT 0000050.
243 Armitage Telephone Log, 12/5/85, ALZ 015341.
244 See, for example, Secord, OIC Deposition, 3/9/88, p. 99 ("I didn't have any contact with the Defense Department save one meeting with Rich Armitage early on and then another one quite by accident with Noel Koch").
245 Secord, FBI 302, 3/11/92, p. 14.
246 Secord, Grand Jury, 1/25/91, p. 94.
247 Ibid.
248 Secord, FBI 302, 3/11/92, pp. 10, 13.
249 Secord, Grand Jury, 1/25/91, pp. 94-95.
250 Secord, FBI 302, 3/11/92, p. 11.
251 Armitage recalled that North invoked Secord's name as part of North's defense for the Iran operation. (Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, pp. 26-27: "And Ollie told me[,] roughly, when I said ['] this is a bad deal ['] -- it was my usual talking point with Ollie when we were alone -- and he said ['] and Secord's in it[']. . . . His response to me was ['] Dick Secord is really doing the Lord's work and that he's going to get the Medal of Freedom from the President, and he deserves it.[']".)
252 Special Project Re Iran, 12/5/85, ALZ 0041745-52. This paper refines a PROFs message that North sent Poindexter on December 4, 1986. (PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW002070-73.

E.g. Platt Note, 12/5/85, ALW 0036859 ("Message from North to Iran via Israelis[:] Our arms deliveries predicated on following: 1. no more terrorism[;] 2. moderate gov[;] 3. Iran must not lose the war w Iraq.[;] 4. Release of hostages."); Ross Note, 12/5/85, ALW 0047062 (noting Raphel's report on "ON [Oliver North] message to Iran;" same four points as Platt note); Hill Note, 12/6/85, ANS 0001236 ("how they will argue [ -- ] NP [Platt]: Ollie [North]: we shd [should] go ahead for long term stratg [strategic] int. [interest] w Iran + if we reneg [sic], there will be 4 dead hostg [hostages] + we may have to mount rescue"); Platt Note, 12/6/85, ALW 0036863 ("Arms for Hostages -- Israel has been trading arms for Jews for years. Ship arms. Get 40 Iranian Jews. . . . Meron runs it[.] This specific deal -- Israeli sends Hawks -- Phoenix -- replaced by 3300 I TOWs. Ollie has done memo to Pres [President Reagan] for 10 o clock. -- should go ahead because of longer term strategic benefit -- if we renege will have 4 dead hostages in 10 days -- will have to move"); Hill Note, 12/6/85, ANS 0001238 ("Arma [Armacost] -- Ollie told Iranians that as part of Night Owl deal -- They shd give up t'ism [terrorism] [;] -- install moderate govt[;] -- win war w IQ [Iraq]} (!) ha ha Ollie is laughable.").

North's paper apparently was the basis of a detailed briefing that Poindexter gave Shultz over secure telephone the afternoon of December 5, 1985. (Hill Note, 12/5/85, ANS 0001228-29 ("3300 TOW. 60 Hawks Emph [Emphasis] is on rel [relations] w post-Kh. [Khomeini] Iran more than on hostages. . . .").) Independent Counsel was not able to determine whether a copy was provided to President Reagan, as Platt's note reports.

254 During the November 10, 1986, meeting, Weinberger made extensive notes on the backs of the pages of North's December 1985 paper. After the meeting, the briefing book apparently was returned to ISA, "broken down" and refiled. Although Armitage obviously returned this document to the files, it was not produced to Congress or Independent Counsel in 1987. The OIC first located the copy of North's paper with Weinberger's notes when it reviewed a segregated collection of Iran/contra material at ISA in 1992.
255 Armitage's logs show that North placed a telephone call to Armitage's office at 6:50 p.m. on December 5, 1985, but they apparently did not speak. The next morning, North called again and spoke to Armitage at 8:30 a.m. North arrived at Armitage's office at 9:00 a.m., and he called and spoke to Armitage by telephone at 10:05 a.m. (Armitage Telephone Log, 12/5/85, ALZ 015341; ibid., 12/6/85, ALZ 015342; Armitage Meeting Log, 12/6/85, ALZ 016441.) Although no witness explained this series of contacts, the sequence of events suggests that North called Armitage to tell him of the paper, then dropped off a copy at Armitage's office, and then called back an hour later to get Armitage's views after he had read the document.
256 Armitage, FBI 302, 1/30/92, p. 5.
257 Hill Notes, 12/5/85, ANS 0001228-29.
258 Armitage, Telephone Log, 12/6/85, ALZ 015342.
259 Raphel Note, 12/6/85, ALW 0062391; Raphel Chronology, 1987, p. 2, ALW 0056727.
260 Prospects for Immediate Shipment of I-HAWK and I-TOW Missiles, ALZ 0058747.
261 State of Israel, The Iranian Transactions -- A Historical Chronology, Part One, 7/29/87, p. 55, AOW 0000068, as released in Majority Report, p. 197.
262 See Classified Appendix.
263 Armitage, Tower Commission Interview, 12/18/86, p. 5.
264 Armitage, FBI 302, 3/3/92, p. 1; Armitage, Grand Jury, 4/29/92, p. 86.
265 Rudd, Select Committees Deposition, 6/22/87, p. 3 (joint deposition with Gaffney).
266 Possibility for Leaks, ALZ 004343-44.
267 Rudd, Select Committees Deposition, 6/22/87, pp. 3, 18 (joint deposition with Gaffney).
268 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
269 Gaffney, Select Committees Deposition, 6/22/87, p. 24 (joint deposition with Rudd). Rudd accepted the logic of Gaffney's account but could not specifically recall the "Prospects for Immediate Shipment" paper. (Ibid., pp. 24-25.)
270 Prospects for Immediate Shipment of I-HAWK and I-TOW Missiles, ALZ 0058747.
271 Ibid.
272 Rudd, Select Committees Deposition, 6/16/87, pp. 25, 36, 40, 45, 48-49.
273 Gaffney, Select Committees Deposition, 6/16/87, pp. 125, 128-32.
274 Rudd, Select Committees Deposition, 6/16/87, p. 26; Koch Note, AOX 000812.
275 Rudd, Select Committees Deposition, 6/16/87, p. 45 ("I have no idea where it [the TOW paper] is" and have not made any inquiry to Armitage about its existence).
276 Rudd, Select Committee Deposition, 6/22/87, pp. 19-20, 26-28 (joint deposition with Gaffney).
277 Gaffney & Rudd, Select Committees Deposition, 6/22/87, Exhibits 1-2.
278 Armitage, FBI 302, 1/30/92, p. 3.
279 Bloomfield, Grand Jury, 5/1/92, pp. 62-63.
280 Garrett, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, p. 19 (Garrett indicated to Thelma Stubbs Smith, in the presence of Kay Leisz, "that [the requests] would include personal notes and her [Smith's] response to me was 'I don't believe there are any notes."'); accord Garrett, Affidavit, 4/28/92, ¶ 11, ALZ 00400536.
281 Garrett, Affidavit, 4/28/92, ¶ 11, ALZ 0045036; Garrett, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, p. 59 (Weinberger's deposition responses "would have been consistent with [Garrett's] belief from the outset, and, as I said, I did not observe the Secretary to be a copious notetaker at all of the meetings that I attended with him so it didn't trouble me. . . .")
282 Garrett, FBI 302, 4/8/92, p. 6; Garrett, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, p. 17; accord ibid., pp. 67-68 (Garrett was not aware that at the time of Weinberger's congressional deposition, Weinberger had "several hundred pages possibly" of notes in his desk).
283 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
284 Garrett, Affidavit, 4/28/92, ¶ 11, ALZ 0045036 (Garrett "did not personally question Secretary Weinberger about the existence of personal notes or diaries."); accord Garrett, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, pp. 58, 66, 77 (Garrett did not follow up on the inquiries about notes and records raised in Weinberger's congressional deposition.).
285 Garrett, Affidavit, 4/28/92, ¶¶ 11-13, ALZ 0045036-37.
286 Garrett, Grand Jury, 10/28/92, pp. 20-21, 22, 24, 35 (Weinberger); ibid., pp. 10-11 (Taft).
287 In an affidavit submitted by Weinberger's attorneys, Powell stated that he regarded Weinberger's daily notes as a "personal diary" and thought it "entirely possible" that Weinberger would not have understood these personal notes to be within the scope of congressional or OIC document requests. (Powell, Affidavit, 4/21/92, ¶ 3, ALZ 0045089.) Powell's detailed 1992 account of Weinberger's note-taking, while quite helpful to the OIC, was also consistent with a defense strategy to demonstrate that Weinberger was not secretive about his notes. Indeed, Powell, who cooperated extensively with Weinberger's counsel, provided increasingly vivid descriptions of Weinberger's notes as the investigation progressed. (Compare Powell, FBI 302, 2/24/92, p. 2 with Powell, Affidavit, 4/21/92, ¶¶ 3-4, ALZ 0045089 and Powell, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, pp. 19-20, 23.)
288 Powell, Select Committees Interview Memorandum, 4/20/87, p. 9, AMY 000568.
289 Powell, Select Committees Deposition, 6/19/87, p. 54-55. Powell's reference to "a diary of this ilk" may refer to the notebook that Powell began to maintain when he became deputy national security adviser in January 1987. (Powell, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, pp. 14-15.)
290 As one example of Powell's contemporaneous familiarity with Weinberger's diary notes, Powell actually helped to create Weinberger's daily diary entries for October 10, 1985, the day that U.S. military forces captured the hijackers of the Achille Lauro cruise ship in the Mediterranean. Weinberger, who had been flying from Canada to Maine and made an unscheduled return to Washington as the military action unfolded, apparently was too busy to create his typical log of calls and activities and asked Powell to create a chronology of the day's events for him. Later that day, Powell gave Weinberger a cover note ("Sec Def, Chronologies. Does not include all your calls. VR [very respectfully], CP") and two handwritten pages on which Powell had noted Weinberger's afternoon and evening activities. Weinberger subsequently annotated Powell's entries and filed all three pages with his daily diary notes. Weinberger's accompanying diary entry says "See attached slips for calls from + to plane." (Weinberger Diary, 10/10/85, ALZ 0039713c-13g.)
291 In a trial preparation interview with the OIC in late 1992, by contrast, Powell stated that Weinberger, "[m]ore often than not," made notes on his 5" x 7" pad while working at his "stand up desk," and that Weinberger "put them in his desk on the right side. . . ." (Powell, OIC Interview Transcript, 11/5/92, p. 3, ALZ 0075308.)
292 Powell's vague references to Weinberger's "notes," as opposed to his "diary," may have been calculated to avoid giving overtly false testimony while providing as little information as possible.
293 Memorandum from Leisz for the Record, 10/1/90, ALZ 0051360.
294 Leisz, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, p. 16.
295 Leisz, FBI 302, 2/3/92, p. 2; Leisz, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, pp. 17-18; Leisz, OIC Interview, 6/15/92, p. 14.
296 Smith, Affidavit, 4/29/92, ¶ 7, ALZ 0045122-23. Also, as discussed above, none of Weinberger's meeting notes has a C&D file number.
297 Leisz, OIC Interview, 6/15/92, p. 22.
298 Leisz's typed, undated note was attached to Weinberger's notes of the November 10, 1986, White House meeting. Although the context for Leisz's note remains a mystery, she typed "I looked through your hand-written notes file and the only file I keep on dictated notes from meetings. Attached is all we have." (ALZ 0058999.) Leisz's handwritten note at the bottom says "P.S. There are no copies." (Ibid.)
299 Leisz Note, ALZ 0060091 (covering Weinberger notes of 6/15/85, 6/16/85 and 6/24/85).
300 Note from Powell to Leisz, 9/24/85, ALZ 0060174.
301 Leisz, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, pp. 42-43, 44 (note to Weinberger); ibid., pp. 47-48, 49 (notes on TWA hijacking); Leisz, OIC Interview, 6/15/92, pp. 20-21 (note from Powell); ibid., p. 22 (Leisz handwriting on meeting notes).
302 Leisz, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, pp. 25-26. Weinberger's former senior military assistant, Admiral Donald S. Jones, recalled, however, that one of Weinberger's secretaries (he could not remember if it was Smith or Leisz) had identified papers on the shelf in the bedroom adjacent to Weinberger's office as "Weinberger's notes." (Jones, FBI 302, 12/22/92, p. 4.)

The latter admissions were consistent with the apparent defense strategy to emphasize that Weinberger had made no effort to hide his notes from those around him.

Leisz also testified that when she and Weinberger went to the Library in December 1991 to review the notes the OIC had found there, both she and Weinberger were surprised to find that his diary and meeting notes were at the Library. (Leisz, Grand Jury, 3/6/92, pp. 31, 34-35.) Leisz said Weinberger had remarked about his diary notes, "these are my telephone logs; I didn't know where they were." (Ibid., p. 35.)

Weinberger's comments are odd given that he and Duncan had looked at the diary notes in the Library in July 1988 and that Weinberger had packed his diary notes and at least some of his meeting notes himself for transfer to the Library. Weinberger's attorneys, who claimed that Weinberger was well aware his diary notes were at the Library when he gave the OIC permission to review his papers there, tried to minimize this episode in a pre-indictment meeting with the OIC, explaining that Weinberger was simply suprised at the way his notes had been neatly archived in individual plastic sleeves.

304 Smith, FBI 302, 3/5/92, pp. 2, 3.
305 Smith, FBI 302, 3/23/92, p. 3.
306 Smith Affidavit, 4/29/92, ¶¶ 5, 7, 11, ALZ 0045122-24.
307 Smith, Grand Jury, 5/8/92, p. 31. Following Smith's Grand Jury appearance, her attorney wrote an indignant letter to the OIC objecting to the suggestion that his client had shaded her initial statements to the OIC after talking to Leisz. (Letter from Banoun to Baker, 5/8/92, 018977.) Later, Weinberger's counsel attached to a court pleading an affidavit from Smith's husband, alleging that the OIC had deliberately falsified the record of the first interview. (Affidavit of Edwin E. Smith, 12/14/92, ¶ 5, attached to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to OIC's Motion In Limine to Exclude Extraneous Evidence Concerning the OIC, 12/16/92, 024526.) The FBI agents who conducted the interview each unequivocally denied Mr. Smith's allegations. (Government's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Edwin E. Smith from Defendant's Pleadings, 12/17/92, 024558.)
308 Garrett, Grand Jury, 4/22/92, p. 19. In the affidavit that Weinberger's counsel procured and submitted to the OIC after Garrett's Grand Jury testimony, his account of his conversation with Smith and Leisz is phrased more narrowly: "I do recall that early on in the process I told [Weinberger's] secretaries that a document request had been received and asked them whether Secretary Weinberger had any notes regarding the Iran-Contra affair. They said he did not have any such notes." (Garrett, Affidavit, 4/28/92, ¶ 11, ALZ 0045036, emphasis added.) In a subsequent interview, however, Garrett again characterized Smith's statement to him as a categorical assertion that "there weren't any notes." (Garrett, OIC Interview, 5/13/92, pp. 10-11, 24-25.)
309 The OIC had determined that there was sufficient evidence from Weinberger's own diary notes, his false statements to congressional investigators and the few documents produced by DoD to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Weinberger had intentionally withheld his notes from Congress. The new documents, however, strengthened the evidence of Weinberger's intent.
310 Garrett's chronological files and a number of relevant subject files from his tenure as DoD general counsel similarly were not produced until October 1992, in response to a Grand Jury subpoena, despite a specific request for such files in May 1992. These files contained additional copies of Garrett's memoranda to Weinberger and Taft. Garrett had previously told the OIC that he had no chronological files. (Garrett, FBI 302, 4/8/92, p. 10.) DoD Deputy General Counsel Michael A. Sterlacci testified, however, that the files had been obtained from Garrett's former office (Garrett had recently resigned as Secretary of the Navy). (Sterlacci, Grand Jury, 10/28/92, p. 7.) Sterlacci also conceded that, although the OGC had forwarded the earlier OIC document request to Garrett, the OGC had made no effort to follow up on the matter when Garrett failed to respond. (Ibid., pp. 11-13.)
311 According to one OGC attorney, the files had been scattered among three different offices, including Sterlacci's, before mid-1992. The attorney said that the missing files had been located when old files were being reviewed to be sent to storage, not in response to the OIC's document requests. (White, FBI 302, 9/4/92, p. 1.)
312 Letter from Chester Paul Beach, Jr., DoD Acting General Counsel, to Gillen, 8/8/92 (020209).
313 This discovery was accidental. An OIC attorney arrived at the Pentagon to take custody of the documents and found that one of Weinberger's attorneys was photocopying the documents in the OGC's offices without any visible supervision by DoD personnel.
314 DoD Directive 5405.2, 7/23/85.

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