TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
HEARING ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO LIMIT LAWYERS
FEES
RESULTING FROM CONGRESSIONALLY ENACTED TOBACCO
SETTLEMENT
DECEMBER 10, 1997
Overview:
Introduction
- Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would particularly like to thank you for
holding these hearings on what we all agree is a very important issue -
how to insure that billions of dollars from the tentative tobacco settlement
are not diverted away from public health into windfall lawyers' fees.
- There are important considerations in resolving this question. The
lawyers who have worked on these cases are fully entitled to a fair fee.
But we must also understand that their multi-billion dollar fee demands
represent funds that would otherwise be available for taxpayers and
public-health purposes.
- And we must carefully consider the precedent Congress sets in dealing
with this aspect of the tobacco settlement. Almost all of the proposed
fee agreements between the states and their private counsel involve a novel
and dangerous merger of two incompatible concepts: the all-or-nothing contingent
fee, which gives lawyers a personal financial stake in the outcome of a
lawsuit in return for giving the poor access to the courts, and the nearly
unlimited power and resources of the state, the use of which should never
be prejudiced by lawyers' financial self-interest.
- Congress should expressly address this aspect of the settlement through
legislation. The states that have made contingency fee arrangements are
now seeking to repudiate them; the lead attorneys that entered into them
are now reportedly willing to see them replaced by arbitration; and the
courts that have reviewed them have found them unconscionable. The states
and the contingency-fee lawyers freely concede that the settlement cannot
go forward without federal legislation, making Congress itself a party
to the settlement. Yet the contingency-fee lawyers would invoke Congress'
jurisdiction and authority over all major aspects of the settlement except
their billion-dollar fee demands.
- The quantum meruit fee allowance provided for in the
McInnis-Cox-McHale bill is a far more reasonable approach that will direct
as much as possible of the potential settlement fund to taxpayers and
public health.
Our Long-Standing Legal Tradition Abhors Lawyers'
Financial Interest in Litigation
- One of the oldest traditions in Western law is the prohibition on
lawyers' having a financial interest in the outcome of litigation. This
prohibition has its roots in Greek and Roman law, which under the offenses
of "sykophanteia" and "calumnia" barred the same abuses that later became
known to the common law as maintenance, champerty, and barratry. [1] These common-law torts, which in the case of maintenance
and champerty were also crimes until as recently as 1967 in England [2], all originally involved instigation of vexatious suits
by non-parties - in the case of champertors, by persons acting for
pecuniary gain. [3]
- Because a financial stake in the outcome of a lawsuit creates an
inherent conflict of interest with the lawyer's role as an officer of the
Court, contingency fees were originally prohibited in Anglo-American law
as champertous, along with all other arrangements that would give a lawyer
a financial interest in the outcome of his case. These prohibitions are
based on the fear that a contingent fee structure can interfere with the
lawyer's exercise of independent judgment on the client's behalf, as well
as create a divergence or conflict of interests between the contingent-fee
attorney and his or her client. These conflicts of interest can take the
form of unfair fee contracts based on the attorney's superior legal
sophistication; unfair or premature settlements, in which plaintiffs'
attorneys settle a case for less than its fair value in order to avoid
incurring litigation expenses; or even collusive settlements, in which
defendants settle cases on terms that enrich plaintiff's counsel but do
little or nothing for their clients. In addition, the traditional bar on
contingency fees is at least in part rooted in the concern that an
all-or-nothing financial stake in the outcome will lead lawyers to engage
in unethical behavior, to the detriment of their clients or society as a
whole.
- As a result of these concerns, contingency fees were traditionally
deemed unethical, and they remain unlawful in the United Kingdom and most
of the rest of the world to this day. [4]
- In the United States, however, the contingent-fee device gradually
became accepted as a narrow exception to this ancient canon of ethics, for
one simple reason: to give the poor access to the courts. It was permitted
as a "necessary evil," designed to "enabl[e] the poor man with a
meritorious cause of action to obtain competent counsel." [5] As such, Ethical Consideration 2-20 of the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility stated that "a lawyer
generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent-fee basis by
one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee," although such arrangements
were "not necessarily improper where justified by the particular
circumstances of a case" and after full disclosure of all relevant
factors. The ABA's subsequent Model Rules of Professional Conduct maintain
the broad common-law prohibition against acquiring an interest in the
client's cause of action or the subject matter of litigation, and permit
contingency fee arrangements only as a narrow exception to the general
rule: the Comment and Rule in Model Rule 1.5(c) of the ABA's Model Rules
permit contingency fees, but require the sort of full disclosure and other
consumer protections that make it clear that this device is still
primarily justified as a means of assisting those with limited resources
to gain access to courts. [6] Even as so limited,
contingent fees continue to be proscribed in a variety of cases, including
domestic relations, criminal defense and legislative representations. And
the disfavored status of contingency fees is demonstrated by the fact that
courts subject contingency fee arrangements to "stricter scrutiny than
other types of contracts, including fee contracts based on other methods
of computing and paying the fee." [7]
States Do Not Need Contingent-Fee Lawyers
- It is not surprising that states have seldom been contingent-fee
litigants. Sovereigns are of course not the type of indigent plaintiffs
for whom the contingent-fee device was designed: both the federal
government and all the states maintain permanent staffs of attorneys to
prosecute and defend their interests in court. Indeed, four of the state
plaintiffs - California, Colorado, New Hampshire, and Missouri - are
pursuing their claims with their own in-house attorneys. Nor do states
need to spread the risk of defeat in litigation, a secondary justification
for such fees. Because they have a large portfolio of litigation at all
times, they are the ideal self-insuring litigants.
- Their counsel, also, have few if any of the traditional
justifications for entering into contingent-fee contracts. The contingency
that the term "contingent fee" refers to is not the risk of defeat in
court, but the risk of non-payment by the client. Where the client is a
sovereign, that risk is non-existent. When the fees are achieved by virtue
of federal legislation, they are still less contingent, and it is
questionable whether they have been secured by a litigation process in any
meaningful sense of that term.
- In some respects, however, it might seem that states should be able
to avoid at least some of the pitfalls of the contingency-fee device. At a
minimum, they should be sufficiently sophisticated to avoid unfair fee
contracts or disadvantageous settlements. And they have sufficient
bargaining power to deal on equal economic terms with their private
lawyers. Nevertheless, the story of the tobacco litigation to date might
have been designed to illustrate the limitations and risks of the
contingent-fee device.
The Costs of Contingent Fees
Without the Benefits
- Each of those risks has already manifested themselves in this
litigation. First and foremost is the risk of a divergence of interest
between the contingent-fee lawyer and his or her client. As you know, a
number of the contingent-fee lawyers involved in pursuing Florida's
lawsuit against the tobacco industry have placed liens on the proceeds of
the settlement in that case in an attempt to secure the full one-quarter
of the prceeds that the state's contingent-fee contract provided,
preventing Florida - their supposed client - from receiving the first $750
million installment in settlement funds - monies that were supposed to
advance public health. [8]
- The second risk in contingent-fee cases is that the attorneys' fees
will not bear any reasonable relation to the work that the lawyers have
invested in the case. In the Florida case, Judge Harold Cohen rejected the
contingency fee agreement, ruling that the lawyers' demands were
"unconscionable and clearly excessive." In his decision, the
judge estimated that the requested fees would yield an
hourly rate of approximately $7,716, assuming that each
lawyer on the case billed 24 hours a day for the full 42 months the case
went on. [9] Estimates of the attorney's fees provided
for under the existing state contingent-fee contracts range from $14 -19
billion, while the $92 billion settlement of tort claims could generate
more than $30 billion in fees under standard contingent-fee arrangements
for a 33 share of any recovery.
- It is specious to argue that these $45-55 billion in fees are not
being diverted out of the funds available for public health and taxpayers.
The tobacco industry is willing to pay a certain sum to get rid of these
cases. That sum is the total cost of the payment to the plaintiffs and
their lawyers. It is a matter of indifference to the industry how that
sum is divided - 75% for the plaintiffs and 25% for their lawyers, or vice
versa. That means that every penny paid to the plaintiffs' lawyers -
whether it is technically "in" the settlement or not - is money that the
industry could have paid to the states or the private plaintiffs.
Excessive attorneys' fees in this case will not be a victimless crime.
- For whatever reason, Mr. Chairman, these sophisticated litigants do
not seem to have engaged in particularly hard bargaining with their
lawyers. After analyzing all the state fee agreements, Professor John
Strait of Seattle University Law School told the Seattle Times
recently, "What I don't understand is why the other attorneys general
didn't [negotiate better contracts]. We're not talking about
groundbreaking techniques in negotiations. It's just odd that so many went
with vague definitions and large fee amounts." [10] It
may be that here, as in so many cases, governments proved unable to drive
the kind of hard bargain that a profit-driven business would. It may be
that the renowned political clout of these wealthy law firms played a
part: the 89 firms in question reportedly contributed $3.8 million to
federal candidates alone over the past two years. [11]
In any case, it is surely revealing that the states themselves are now
seeking to replace their fee contracts with some arbitration mechanism, on
the grounds that the contracts would generate grossly excessive fees. At a
minimum, I hope that the Subcommittee will look into the question of
whether any of these contracts were competitively bid before deciding that
they represent a free-market valuation of the risks of this litigation.
- The final risk traditionally associated with contingent-fee
contracts - that they would provide an irresistible incentive for improper
conduct - has already been alleged by some of the plaintiffs' lawyers
themselves. The press has reported that in the Florida litigation alone,
one of the state's lawyers has sued another alleging collusion with the
defendants; another of the state's private lawyers is being investigated
for allegedly loaning a state employee some $30,000 as a quid pro quo for
being retained as one of Florida's lawyers; and that same lawyer recently
testified before a Committee of the Florida Senate that a Texas firm that
did no work on the Florida case was going to receive $20 million in fees
for it in violation of the state's bar rules. He also testified that some
of the state's private lawyers "were involved in a nationwide cartel
trying to control legal fees." [12]
The Unholy Alliance: Contingency
Fees and the Power of the State
- But state contingency-fee agreements are worse than merely
unnecessary, and they involve dangers far greater than private
contingency-fee arrangements. State and federal sovereigns are not
ordinary litigants in any sense. First and foremost, they have a higher
responsibility than private litigants and counsel. Government lawyers are
properly held to a higher standard of advocacy than private counsel. And
while most private parties have no higher motive than to recover the
largest possible amount of money in any given case, government has key
non-monetary interests - including, first and foremost, seeing
justice done in every case. On the wall outside the office of the
Solicitor General of the United States the following inscription appears:
"The United States prevails whenever justice is done." State sovereigns
share, or ought to share, that philosophy. And state and federal officials
have programmatic goals that go beyond maximizing monetary recoveries -
particularly in cases like this, which state officials rightly insist
is about much more than money. At the federal level, the Appointments
Clause, Clause 2, Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution, guarantees
that only politically responsible advocates can make litigating decisions
for the United States. But when states contract out their litigating
authority to a contingent-fee lawyer, they automatically create a profound
agency problem: the conduct of the litigation is in the hands of lawyers
whose direct personal interest is in maximizing the state's, and thereby
their own, monetary recovery. It is simply unrealistic to believe that
such agents will give sufficient weight either to the sovereign's abstract
interest in justice and the highest standards of advocacy, or to the
sovereign's non-monetary policy objectives in pursuing litigation.
- Moreover, sovereigns possess a wide array of coercive authorities
outside the civil-justice system that can be used or abused to further
their cause in civil cases, such as parallel criminal, administrative, or
legislative proceedings and investigations, abuse of government records,
misuse of taxing authority, attempts to leverage contracting or
grant-making power, or simply the bully pulpit. [13] The
existence of all these forms of extrajudicial leverage is a moral hazard
for any government litigator, particularly in a high-stakes case. But when
the sovereign's litigating authority is subcontracted not just to a
private lawyer but to a private lawyer subject to the extraordinary
incentive of personally participating in billion-dollar jackpots, the
moral hazard becomes intolerable. In such cases, the contingency-fee
device ensures that an actor motivated solely by the allure of staggering
personal wealth will be heard in the highest councils of the government.
Ironically, almost two millenia ago Roman law found it necessary to outlaw
a particular form of champerty whereby, to quote Professor Radin,
"a claimant offered to give, or actually gave, a share in his claim
to the Imperial Treasury (the fiscus). The fiscus had far-reaching
procedural privileges and in general was so powerful a plaintiff that its
claims were rarely resisted. Evidently, if this transfer was accepted,
many a dubious claim would be recovered, and the claimant might well be
satisfied with half. A series of enactments forbade this particularly
knavish fashion of sharing ill-gotten gains with the state." [14] Almost eighteen hundred years later, the
Supreme Court ruled in the case of Tumey v. Ohio (273 U.S. 510, 1926)
that a defendant's right to due process is violated when he or she is
tried in a court that receives its own fees out of the fines that it
levies. The Court surveyed American and English common law, finding "no
usage at common law by which justices of the peace or inferior judicial
officers were paid fees on condition that they convicted the defendants."
Instead, the Court observed that "there was at the common law the greatest
sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest, however small
of infinitesimal, in the justices of the peace." (273 U.S. at
525). Mortgaging the sovereign's litigating authority to lawyers
with an enormous stake in the recovery approaches the same level of abuse.
- A final flaw when states litigate through contingent fees is the
absence of political accountability. Since lawmakers do not need to
appropriate funds for litigation on contingency, there is far less
likelihood that state legislatures will be able to scrutinize the decision
either to hire private lawyers or to pursue the lawsuit in question. In
this case, for example, the Attorney General of Mississippi hired Richard
Scruggs on a contingency-fee basis for precisely that reason, with full
knowledge that the governor and legislature would not have approved it. As
Attorney General Moore has conceded, "I knew I wouldn't be able to spend
taxpayer dollars on this." [15] Whether or not these
arrangements formally violate state constitutional restrictions on
off-budget financing, they violate the spirit of democratic government,
which requires political accountability for policy decisions.
A Better Solution: Fees That Reflect the Public
Interest
- In short, state use of contingency-fee contracts is inherently
abusive in principle, and has proven intolerable in the current case. What
should Congress put in its place?
- The plaintiffs' bar would prefer that Congress do nothing
concerning their fees, leaving the issue for resolution through a side
agreement between the parties - which may or may not already exist, but
which has not been disclosed to the public or Congress. It reportedly
contemplates some type of binding arbitration, possibly combined with an
annual cap on total payments. In support of this outcome plaintiffs'
lawyers argue that principles of federalism and freedom of contract
militate against federal legislation in this area. And yesterday Attorney
General Moore argued before the Commerce Committee that advocates of the
full recovery rule - the so-called "loser pays" or English rule - should
be particularly reluctant to tamper with these fees, which he regards as
the fruits of a litigation victory. These arguments are each without
merit.
- First, there is every reason to believe that unless Congress
authoritatively settles the fees issue it could obstruct any larger
settlement. As we have seen, disgruntled Florida attorneys have already
delayed disbursement of three-quarters of a billion dollars to the state
in attempting to enforce their original contracts. With so many more
billions of dollars at stake in a national settlement, why should we
expect greater forbearance from lawyers in each of the other thirty-nine
states involved in the settlement? Second, as I mentioned previously, any
funds paid by the tobacco industry to opposing counsel are by definition
monies that the industry could have paid to the states and injured
plaintiffs as part of the settlement. The lawyers' fees simply reduce the
size of the settlement that the states need to cover the costs that
inspired these suits in the first place. If Congress is to act at all in
this area, there is no reason why we should not look at the totality of
the fund available to resolve this dispute.
- That, of course, is also the reason why the plaintiffs' federalism
arguments are without merit. The parties to these suits - including the
states - have invoked Congress' authority to codify their settlement. They
freely concede that without congressional action the settlement cannot
become effective. They have yet to explain why it is appropriate to
federalize almost every significant aspect of the settlement except the
fees of the attorneys involved in it.
- The liberty of contract argument likewise ignores decisive facts.
Courts already strictly scrutinize contingency-fee contracts, and freely
revise them if they are found to be unfair. And Congress, at the
plaintiffs' urgent request, is now considering whether to supersede the
judicial function with respect to almost every other aspect of these
cases. The plaintiffs themselves are now actively seeking to abrogate the
existing fee contracts in this case, and to replace them with arbitration
agreements. Many decades ago Justice Holmes observed that people could not
withdraw subjects from federal jurisdiction by making contracts about
them. If that is true of pre-existing contracts, it is greatly more true
of shadowy arbitration agreements that apparently have not yet been
signed.
- Finally, although I strongly support the full recovery rule, I am
utterly at a loss as to how it could justify the multibillion-dollar fees
being discussed. The rule means what it says-that litigants are made whole
for their injuries, including their legal expenses. When someone can
demonstrate to me that the states' trial lawyers incurred legal fees of
$7,000 an hour, I will concede that their lawyers deserve that level of
recompense.
The McInnis-Cox-McHale Bill (H.R. 2740)
- Rather than leave the fee-setting to an unaccountable body of
arbitrators, we in Congress have the responsibility to ensure that we are
voting for a fair and knowable outcome rather than a process. At some
point in this process, some politically accountable body finally needs to
take responsibility for legal fees that, at a minimum, will run into tens
or hundreds of millions of dollars.
- The McInnis-Cox-McHale legislation (H.R.
2740), with its $150 per hour rate, represents a fair accommodation of
the conflicting interests in this case. Unlike the existing contingent-fee
contracts and the reported arbitration proposals, it genuinely applies the
full-recovery rule, ensuring that plaintiffs and their attorneys recover
their appropriate expenses.
Existing Fee Limitations
- The fees provided in the McInnis bill are consistent with the fee
contract entered into by the only state that provides for specific hourly
rates, Maine, whose fee agreement provides $150 per hour for partners and
$120 per hour for associates, with a further cap on total allowable fees,
which cannot exceed 13% of the proceeds. And it is consistent with
previous legislative attorney's fees. The Sessions Amendment to the
Labor-HHS appropriation provided for a somewhat higher fee of $250 per
hour. But under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.
3006A, criminal defense attorneys are limited to $60 an hour for time
spent before the court and $40 an hour for preparation time, though they
may seek court approval for fees of up to $75 an hour; their fees are
further capped at $3500 per case for felonies, $1000 per case for
misdemeanors, and $2500 per case for appeals. The Equal Access to Justice
Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412, provides for fees consistent with prevailing market
rates, but caps those rates at $125 an hour, unless higher fees are
specifically justified by an unusually high cost of living or a limited
availability of lawyers capable of pursuing the litigation. Just last
month, as part of the FY 1998 Commerce-Justice-State Department
Appropriation Act, Congress included these limits to attorneys fees
awarded under the Murtha Amendment to certain prevailing federal criminal
defendants. The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 7430, permits awards of
attorneys fees to certain prevailing parties in tax cases, but caps them
at $110 per hour. Although these statutes cover payments from the federal
treasury, I do not see why we should be more protective of the fisc than
of state taxpayers and public health.
- Obviously no method of calculating fees will be entirely satisfactory.
An hourly rate will only roughly account for the higher risk of the earlier
lawsuits, in that it will reward those who have worked the largest number
of hours. But other alternatives like a set percentage are more arbitrary,
whether the percentage chosen is large or small; and codifying an arbitration
process simply dumps all of these problems in the lap of a third party
- as well as continuing the process of political evasion that has characterized
these cases from the outset. Under these circumstances, a set hourly rate
seems the best - or perhaps the least bad - option.
- Finally, I should add that a legislated rate like the McInnis bill
is entirely appropriate as a stand-alone bill, even without legislation
codifying a global settlement. As I mentioned earlier, settlement
legislation without a fee provision could easily result in an obstruction
of the settlement; stand-alone fee legislation could facilitate either a
codified settlement or a judicial resolution. And stand-alone fee
legislation, by limiting the diversion of resources to attorneys, can
enhance the resources available to the parties themselves.
Constitutionality of the McInnis-Cox-McHale
Bill
- I addressed earlier the constitutional objections to
any federal fee legislation. I will offer only a few
additional observations on specific issues relating to the
McInnis-Cox-McHale bill. I am quite sanguine about the constitutionality
of a stand-alone federal fee bill. The transfer of tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars - much less billions or tens of billions of dollars -
from the tobacco industry to the plaintiffs' bar would have clear, direct,
and demonstrable effects on interstate commerce - particularly given the
fact that such fees would necessarily reduce the monies available to
address tobacco-related public health issues that even more clearly
implicate interstate commerce. In my view, these facts bring the fee
transaction itself comfortably within the scope of Congress's regulatory
authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause. And even if they did not,
it is well established that Congress may, if it chooses, address aspects
of interstate commerce in a piecemeal fashion rather than comprehensively.
- I also believe it is clear that the McInnis-Cox-McHale bill is
consistent with the Tenth Amendment. The McInnis bill regulates all
attorneys' fees in the tobacco cases, both those of the states and those
of other plaintiffs. As a result, it is not federal regulation of states
as states, but rather the application of a general rule to both the
states and the private plaintiffs. Accordingly, it is completely
consistent with both New York v. United States (505 U.S. 144, 1992),
and Printz v. United States (117 S.Ct. 2365,
1997), which condemn federal commandeering of state governments.
- Like several other members of the Committee, I disagree with the
Supreme Court's holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority (469 U.S.
528, 1985), which held that Congress could impose virtually any
restriction on the states so long as it was part of a rule of general
applicability. Under Garcia, of course, there is no question but
that the general rule set out in the McInnis bill is constitutional. I
believe that the Court was instead quite correct when in National
League of Cities v. Usery (426 U.S. 833, 1976),
it invalidated the application of even general rules if they interfered
with "functions essential to [the States'] separate and independent
existence." In Usery, the Court struck down the application of
federal wage-and-hour laws to state employees as such an intrusion on
"traditional governmental functions." But although prosecuting state
interests in court is almost certainly a traditional state function,
entering into contingency-fee agreements to do so is clearly not. As
discussed earlier, these agreements are quite rare and recent, and cannot
be considered core functions that are essential to the states'
independence. Therefore, even under a more exacting standard the McInnis
bill would pass Tenth-Amendment muster.
- The questions of taking lawyer's property and impairing their
contracts appear to be equally clear. It is of course true that Congress
may constitutionally take private property, although such takings must be
compensated. And the Supreme Court has been extraordinarily permissive
about legislation that retroactively alters private contracts - more
permissive than I believe it should be. [16] I
personally could not conscientiously urge Congress to enact legislation
that purported to limit attorneys' fees but actually only shifted them to
federal taxpayers in the form of liability for a taking. And I would be
loath to endorse legislation revising vested contractual interests, no
matter how justifiable the cause. Fortunately, the McInnis bill does
neither.
- The attorneys' fees in this case will accrue if, and only, there is
a favorable resolution. To date there has been a global settlement whose
viability depends on as yet unenacted federal legislation, and state
settlements in Mississippi and Florida that themselves nullify the
pre-existing fee agreements. In other words, the contingencies specified
in the fees contracts have simply not occurred, and they have accordingly
conveyed no vested interests that could be taken or impaired.
Conclusion
- Congress will set a critical precedent in this case, whether by
action or inaction. We can either step up to the plate and take political
responsibility for a key aspect of the settlement, or we can continue the
course of evasion and irresponsibility that has characterized the fee
issue to date.
Endnotes
- 1 See Max Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 49, 51, 53 (1935).
- 2 See id. at 67; Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics 8.13, at 489.
- 3 Radin, supra, at 67.
- 4 Wolfram, supra, '9.4 at 526-27.
- 5 Alfred D. Youngwood, The Contingent
Fee - A Reasonable Alternative, 28 Mod. L. Rev. 330, 333
(1965).
- 6 Indeed, the Comment to Model Rule
I.5(c) specifically quotes Ethical Consideration 2-20 of the Code for the
proposition that the two "bases for permitting contingent fee
arrangements" were that such arrangements were "often...the only practical
means by which [one party] can economically afford, finance, and obtain
the services of a competent lawyer...and successful prosecution of the
claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid." American
Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, at 62
(citations omitted). The second condition is of course directly related to
the first.
- 7 Wolfram, supra, '9.1
at 498.
- 8 Peter Katel, Spoils of Law, Newsweek,
Dec. 8, 1997, at 53, 55.
- 9 The State of West Virginia's contingent-fee
contract has already been invalidated by the State's court as unconstitutional.
- 10 Lawyers
Could Get
Billions in Tobacco Deal, Seattle Times, Oct. 5, 1997, at A1.
"Private lawyers representing 40 states in their suits against the tobacco
industry stand to get more than $14.7 billion over 25 years if the national
settlement between the states and cigarette makers is approved by Congress
and the White House, a Seattle Times analysis shows."
- 11 Id.
- 12 Katel, supra, at 54, 55.
- 13 For example, hearings before the House Commerce Committee's
Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee in 1995 revealed that the Food
and Drug Administration had collaborated with plaintiffs' lawyers litigating
a private suit over the safety of spinal screws. In violation of a court
order, the FDA released boxes of documents containing the names of the
doctors who had participated on a confidential basis in FDA studies. Because
the doctors had been concerned that their participation would leave them
open to lawsuits, the information was considered highly sensitive and was
kept at the FDA in encoded form. Nevertheless, the documents were turned
over with the key to trial lawyers. After the information was leaked,
there was a four-fold increase in the number of doctors subpeonaed. And
this improper use of data collected outside the litigation occurred when
the federal government was not even a party to the lawsuit.
- 14 Radin, supra, at 55.
- 15 Michael Orey, Fanning the Flames, Am. Law., April 1996,
at 52.
- 16 See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1 (1976).
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