I.  Either a person is only a body (No-Ownership theory), or the person is a Cartesian ego, or the concept of person is a primitive concept (of something which is the subject of P- and M- Predicates).
 

II: No-Ownership Theory is incoherent.
 

(?!) A. The relationship between a person's body and a person's experiences, states

            of consciousness is a contingent one.

        B. There are at least two senses of have:

                1. To 'have' a state of consciousness, experience, etc., is (for that state, etc.)

                        to be causally dependent on some body.

                2. To 'have' a state of consciousness, experience, etc., is for some non-

                        body (e.g. a Cartesian ego, soul, etc.) to be defined in terms of

                        experiences, states, etc., including the one "had".

        C. It is okay to use the first sense of 'have' due to the fact that "the uniqueness

                of this body is sufficient to give rise to the idea that one's experiences can

                be ascribed to some particular individual thing." (106) Though it is not

                necessary that this particular body "possess" that mental state, etc. That

                is, the fact that this dependency exists is a contingent fact, and is

                consistent with A.

                        1. My experiences are had by my body.

                        2. Facts about my body and my experiences are contingent.

                        3. (1) is a fact about my body and my experiences.

                        4. (1) is contingent.

        D. It is not okay to use the second sense of 'have' due primarily to the fact that

            since an "ego" is defined in terms of the experiences it has had, or its

            mental states, the fact that this ego has had any given experience is, ipso

            facto, necessary. In other words, if the ego had not experienced a parti-

            cular mental state that it did, it would not be the ego it is but rather some

            other. The second 'have' is inconsistent with A.

                        1. My experience is had by my ego.

                        2. Any fact about my ego and my experiences is a necessary

                                one.

                        3. (1) is a fact about my ego.

                        4. (1) is necessary.

            E. Since D2 is inconsistent with A, it is non-sensical and should be abandoned.
 

III: Strawson's criticism of the No-Ownership Theory.
 

            A. Assume I. A-E to be true.

            B. Restate I. C. 1: My experiences are had by my body.

            C. All experiences can be divided in at least two classes:

                    1. Those applying to my body.

                    2. Those not applying to my body.
 
            D. The rule defining which experiences fall into class C. 1 is: An experience

                    which my body had.

            E. The rule defining which experiences fall into class C. 2 is: An experience

                    which my body did not have.

            F. Both D and E express necessary facts about relationships between

                    my experiences and my body.

            G. F is inconsistent with Roman numeral I, Section A.

            H. G and Roman numeral I, Section A, show that the No-Ownership view is

                    incoherent.
 

III. There are no such things as Cartesian Egos.
 

A. A predicative expression 'x is f' which expresses a genuine concept only if certain criteria are met.

        1. It can be ascribed to more than one thing.

        2. It is ascribed to things on some basis.

        3. The basis on which it is ascribed to different things makes the same contribution to our understanding of the predicate.
 

B. One couldn't ascribe P-predicates to others if they were Cartesian Egos.

        1. Reductio ad absurdum. Assume: One can ascribe P-predicates to others if they are Cartesian Egos.

        2. To ascribe a P- predicate to others one must be able to identify others as subjects.

        3. Cartesians can identify others as the unique satisfiers of open sentences such as:

                'is a subject of experience which bears uniquely to body N the relation my experiences bear to body M.'

        4. A necessary condition of the analogy argument is that: I can identify others as subjects of experience if first I can
                speak of my experiences.

        5. By A. 1. and B. 2.: I can speak of my experiences, only if I can identify others as subjects of experience.

        6. By B. 4., basis for identifying others as subjects of experience is that I can first speak of my experiences.

        7. By B. 5., basis for speaking of my experiences is that I can identify others as subjects of experience.

        8. By A. 3., basis for speaking of my experiences is that I can first identify others as subjects of experience (so that one
                basis does not have priority over the other).

        9. Absurdity: One cannot simultaneously hold B. 6. and B. 8.

        10. Negate B.1.: One can't ascribe P-predicates to others if they are Cartesian Egos.

C. We can ascribe P-predicates to ourselves.

D. Therefore, persons are not Cartesian Egos.
 

IV. The concept of person is primative.
 

A. Given I-III, the concept of person is primative.