Chapter Seven Sugar: An Atlantic English Industry1 From 1689 to 1722, Parliament debated and legislated often to regulate the West India sugar industry because this all- Atlantic business crucially affected the economic well-being of England and its empire. As early as the 1660s, sugar sales linked the livelihoods of West Indian planters, English corn farmers, American distillers, Newfoundland fishermen, Irish cattle raisers, Scottish refiners, English sugar bakers, East Indian suppliers of slave clothing, the Royal African Company, and empire-wide shipbuilders. Parliament thus had many reasons to respond thoughtfully to petitions from the bankers, industri- alists, merchants, and landlords who endorsed West Indian sugar planter pleas for statutes to rescue them from market crises.2 Such government action was not always forthcoming before the Glorious Revolution. While Stuart monarchs struggled with their Parliaments, the petitions of planters, shippers, merchants, refiners, and their political spokesmen often met with neglect or resistance. The Glorious Revolution reversed this situation and unleashed a legislative power freer to liberate the profit-making potential of sugar and sugar related English industries. Parlia- mentary acts accomplished two goals for the sugar business before 1722: they ended foreign competition, and they created a resil- ient home market for it and its many byproducts. Although deal- ers experienced "Booms and Slumps" throughout the period, post- 1689 statutes ultimately fashioned lucrative sugar and sugar based industries by 1722.3 Sugar and the State: 1640-1689 England's sugar business began only after an English West Indian tobacco industry failed. A rise in tobacco prices during the 1620s had stimulated English colonization of the Islands, but when the tobacco boom ended in the 1630s planters sought another cash crop. They discovered it in the "Sugar Revolution."4 English colonists learned how to plant sugar from the Dutch who had been carrying this Portuguese colonial product from Brazil to refineries in the Netherlands since the early 1600s. By 1643, England's largest sugar colony, Barbados, had 18,500 men produc- ing sugar for the home market; 6,400 of them were slaves.5 From the 1640s to the 1660s, the quantity of sugar shipped to England increased from 3,000 to almost 10,000 tons yearly: by 1700 the West Indies exported over 20,000 tons to England annually.6 Despite their expanding sales, sugar growers experienced unpredictable, often negative, market tendencies throughout the seventeenth century.7 Sugar prices tumbled about 70 percent between 1645 and 1680, and their commodity "ran into the crises of overproduction, typical of colonial products that were easier to grow than to market."8 Sugar planters, however, produced a commodity where rapid decline in prices encouraged a "greater per capita consumption" within related manufactures such as rum, bakery goods, and drink sweeteners. This elastic element within the make-up of sugar itself continued to draw capital to the industry even in periods of market surpluses and declining prof- its.9 Planters responded to their complex economic environment by increasing output even when prices fell or gluts threatened. They also learned to compensate for market fluctuation by de- veloping a variety of cost-saving stratagems, and these included the employment of cheaper Dutch ships to carry their sugar to all European markets. Charles I and Parliament tried to block Islanders from their blatant avoidance of Navigation Acts restrictions in the 1640s, but the Civil Wars made it impossible to control the price-con- scious West Indian planters. Barbados, the only large-scale English sugar-producing colony until the 1660s, successfully challenge the mother country's restrictive laws into the Common- wealth period.10 While Dutch bankers provided cheap credit, reliable bills of exchange, and a European market for the is- land's sugar growers, ships from the Netherlands carried slaves and other goods back to them. The English West Indians thus nourished Dutch rather than English capitalism during their first sugar-making decade. Until Cromwell's government stopped them, Dutch vessels carried English West Indian sugar to Holland for refining and sale throughout Europe, and even into England it- self.11 Intent on recapturing England's plantation trade for English businessmen, a Commonwealth Parliament passed a fresh Navigation Act in 1651, and its troops forced Barbados to submit to the new government's authority.12 When the Protectorate ended, West Indians again reopened their prohibited connection with the Netherlands, but to their great disappointment the returned Stuarts supplanted Interregnum legislation with even more trade limiting rules of its own. From 1660 to 1689, Barbados and the other sugar colonies began an almost thirty-year period in which they either obeyed Navigation Acts, petitioned for freedom from English law, or traded with the enemy.13 West Indian planters were not alone in their struggle to determine English sugar policy. A no less conspicuous battle raged at home over who should fashion the sugar trade during this period. Although Restoration monarchs and their Parliaments agreed that the West Indian plantations should serve the needs of empire, they disagreed over whether the king or Parliament had the authority to designate the beneficiaries of this or any other English international trade. Charles and James II defended their prerogative rights to grant trading monopolies to subjects of their choosing, and they championed Navigation Act restrictions principally to enhance the value of the charters that they award- ed or sold to favorites and trading syndicates.14 Parliament countered these kingly claims with arguments that the Crown had forfeited its constitutional right to grant such monopolies before the Civil Wars, and that only Parliament could grant such privileges. These political and economic quarrels over the sugar islands became most rancorous after Charles II granted a trading Charter to an association of investors known first as the Company of Royal Adventurers into Africa (1660), and later as the Royal African Company of England (1672).15 The Charter awarded the Company privileges in an African trade that included a monopoly for selling black slaves to English colonists. Despite objec- tions by growers that the Charter raised slave prices and the cost of other raw materials essential for the production of sugar, Charles and James II defended the rights of their Royal African Company.16 K. G. Davies has provided a sociology of this trading Compa- ny whose future was so "heavily staked on the undisturbed contin- uation of the Stuart line."17 More than half of the first 32 adventurers were peers or members of the royal family: "They included the Duke of York, the Princesses Maria and Henrietta, Prince Rupert, the Dukes of Albermarle and Buckingham, and the Earls of Bath, Ossory, Pembroke, St. Albans and Sandwich."18 When Charles II reconstituted the company in 1672, its membership became more diverse, but no less dependent on Crown sovereignty for its monopoly.19 The newly constituted shareholders, now known as the Royal African Company, included Members of Parlia- ment, London politicians, military men, merchants, East Indian nabobs, titled landlords, bankers, ironmongers, grocers, and even some plantation owners.20 Scholars familiar with English politi- cal and colonial history will recognize the names of Shaftesbury, Arlington, Locke, Carteret, and Gorges. Other contributors were landowners, such as John Lowther of Lowther, and his cousin, John Lowther, who also controlled the port of Whitehaven, and most of Cumberland's coal mines. Josiah Child represented the London merchant brotherhood, and the banker Robert Clayton exemplified the City's pre-Revolutionary financial community. All united in the Royal African Company to trade manufactured goods for African ivory, redwood, gold, and slaves; it was the company's monopoly on supplying slaves to the sugar producing West Indies, however, that was most attractive to investors.21 Once Charles granted the Charter, West Indian planters either paid noncompetitive prices for Company slaves and most other goods carried from England to the Islands, or they smuggled.22 While the Royal African Company's Charter adjusted the prof- itability of the sugar trade to benefit this select group of stockholders, Parliament, on its side, wrote statutes to create a sugar industry that rewarded a much broader clientele of capital- ists and landlords. The first of these bills, and in the long run perhaps the most potent, was a multi-purpose revenue statute, that included codicils designed to tax sugar, to expand its market, and to encourage an English refining business.23 As with other Restoration economic statutes, this bill borrowed heavily from its Cromwellian predecessors. Until the 1650s, Parliament treated sugar as it did other articles of trade, and merchants paid a 5 per cent ad valorem tax on all imported sugar. In 1651, and again in 1657, Cromwell's Parliament altered this practice when itrated sugar's quality rather than its quantity.24 After 1657, refined and clayed sugar paid import duties almost five times the rate of imported raw sugar.25 The 1660 Restoration version of these statutes (supplemented by a 1672 bill) boosted processed sugar duties almost to the point of excluding refined sugars from English ports entirely.26 Although it would take several post-Revolutionary statutes to complete the transition, higher duties on all but raw sugar accorded English refiners a competitive advantage over West Indian or Dutch rivals. These several taxing acts, with pivotal additional clauses that re- quired foreign refined sugar to pay double the rates of imported plantation sugar, promoted three transformations within the Restoration sugar industry: West Indian planters produced more, mostly unprocessed lower taxed sugar, for a protected domestic market; sea captains built or hired bigger ships to haul the much bulkier unrefined product home; English refineries monopolized the entire sugar refining industry now protected by statute.27 A second bill of 1660, "An Act for the Encourageing and in- creasing of Shipping and Navigation," also remodeled the trans- Atlantic sugar industry. It too renewed a Cromwellian statute, but went beyond it in an indelible way: the Restoration version of the Navigation Act "enumerated" several commodities, including sugar, that merchants must bring to England in English ships before reexporting to the continent.28 Parliament wrote this statute to unite specific colonial commodities, state revenue, and a multitude of domestic industries, such as shipbuilding, and, of course, sugar refining. Shortly afterwards, a third sugar-related statute "For the Encouragement of Trade" closed loopholes in this second act. It fixed punishments for officers failing to supervise the unloading of sugar and the payment of duties before merchants exported the sugar elsewhere.29 Crown and Parliaments updated, strengthened, and renewed these charters and statutes from the 1660s to 1689. Their ac- tions did much to alter the sugar industry, but they did nothing to guarantee its prosperity. Sugar prices plummeted during the 1670s and 80s, and planters, shippers, merchants, and refiners grumbled about lost revenues and failing businesses. West Indi- ans blamed excessive import duties on processed sugar for keeping them from opening Island refineries and the Navigation Acts for limiting their markets to England. Planters and shippers linked the Royal African Company's monopoly to the exorbitant prices they paid for slaves. Exporting merchants resented the addition- al charges forced on them by Navigation Acts that required that shippers haul sugar to English ports before sugar dealers could sell it abroad. English refiners protested against taxes that raised their costs and made their product noncompetitive on continental markets. Although some sugar businessmen, particularly plantation owners, blamed the Navigation Acts for much of their economic distress during the Restoration era, most entrepreneurs charged the Royal African Company with producing almost all their indus- trial woes.30 Entrepreneurs descried the Company's monopoly, and many struggled to corral its trading prerogatives. Relying heavily on cost cutting techniques to maintain profits as sugar prices fell, the most aggressive planters openly defied the Company on the seas. They employed interlopers to bring them cheaper slaves, and they contracted with smugglers to carry illicit sugar to customers in Scotland and Ireland.31 To protect its monopoly, the Royal African Company tracked down intruders in their trade and hauled them before judges who defended the Compa- ny's charter and the Crown's right to grant it. Businessmen responded by hiring lawyers to argue before judges, and writers to challenge the Stuart's prerogative before the political na- tion's reading (and investing) public. Pamphleteers charged that the Company's charter precluded businessmen from exercising their right to trade freely in Africa, and that its monopoly added unjustified costs to all aspects of processing sugar. The fury of "outsiders" against the Royal African Company only increased when James II, in need of additional revenue, forced a compliant Parliament in 1685 to raise sugar duties. In that year, Sir Dudley North introduced a statute that increased import taxes on sugar and other commodities.32 Although plant- ers, shippers, merchants, and refiners protested that the act benefited only monopolists, it became law. The bill raised duties on imported raw sugar, placed heavier taxes on foreign sugars, and increased the drawbacks for merchants who reexported raw sugar. James and Parliament designed many of these stipula- tions to gain the support of English refining and reexporting interests, but the depressed economy of the 1680s caused both groups to denounce the bill.33 Refiners and reexporters experi- enced a serious slump in sales during this decade, and foreign nations retaliated against England's Navigation Acts by limiting the amount of English sugar merchants could sell on the conti- nent.34 To make matters worse, sugar prices hit record lows in the 1680s.35 The Commissioner of Customs thought that "it was 'the abundance of sugar, . . . not the duty, that bring [the] evil,'" but it was a more vicious combination of higher taxes, falling prices, continental restrictions, political unrest, and domestic unemployment that kept sugar from reaping the benefits of a home market that held the secret promise of an economy of scale.36 The Glorious Revolution revealed that promise. Sugar and the State: 1689-1721 The Glorious Revolution ended the seventeenth-century polit- ical struggles that had simmered since the Civil Wars, and it also advanced the fortunes of the English sugar industry. Par- liament's statute-power, and its implicit control over the dis- bursement of royal charters after 1689, removed forever the conflicts about where the prerogative to grant monopolies resid- ed. The Revolution divided Parliament between Whigs and Tories who fought ferociously over policy, including sugar policy, but it unified most Members behind the idea that the political na- tion, now assembling annually at Westminster, had the sole right to legislate English international trade. It also gave sugar industrialists a forum in which to reopen debate about their trade without fear of monarchical interference. Having won the right to "free speech," this "heterogeneous collection" of "planters seeking cheap slaves, merchants seeking unrestricted entry into the African trade, sea-captains seeking full employ- ment," and manufacturers seeking consumers for English commodi- ties flooded Parliament with petitions. "Between 1690 and 1713 about a hundred petitions were presented to Parliament in favor of free trade to Africa, as against fewer than twenty (apart from those of the company itself) which supported monopoly."37 Most pleaded for a fresh national sugar policy that would defend their industrial profits. While legislators debated these petitions, other colonists, traders, ship captains, and manufacturers took more direct action by widening an already illicit, but now unstoppable, interloping trade in slaves and sugar. After 1688, the Royal African Company could only "pretend that its charter was still in force," and interlopers traded freely in slaves and other commodities.38 The Company protested, but private individuals financed interlopers, and defended their economic right to participate as equals in the African and West Indian trade. Captain Robert Portin, in testi- mony given before a 1693 Parliamentary Committee examining the Royal African Company's complaints against trespassers on its monopoly, vindicated the activities of illegal traders when he swore that "the Interlopers sell cheaper," and "That the Planta- tions would be much more plentifuller served with Negroes, by an open Trade."39 Robert Walker, a London West Indian merchant, was more explicit: "The planters have bought of the Dutch, Negroes, 700 in a Ship, for want of Supplies from the Company."40 Despite the illegality of their actions, the interlopers continued to trade for two more decades without much Parliamentary interfer- ence. Protests against the Royal African Company monopoly regular- ly arrived before Parliament each year after the Revolution, but a litigious, post-1689, intraclass struggle blocked Members from rapidly demolishing the Company, or even from rewriting much sugar related legislation.41 For ten years, A new debate on how the mother country and the empire best profited from sugar and the African trade replaced the old divisions over Crown preroga- tives.42 Supporters of most colonists and many Atlantic mer- chants stood on one side of Parliament. They petitioned for freeing commerce of all excessive duties, scrapping many Naviga- tion Act restrictions, and ending the Royal African Company monopoly. Those who applauded the Royal African Company for protecting English-African trade, the Navigation Acts for bene- fiting landlords, and the slave trade for providing business opportunities to English manufacturers stood on the other. In the Parliamentary center stood Members searching for compromises that might unify conflicting sugar interests. After 1698, Parliament wrote several acts that restructured England's post-Revolutionary sugar industry in hopes of satisfy- ing the broadest confederation of sugar entrepreneurs. Members reconfirmed earlier English laws linking sugar planters, English refiners, and reexporters of processed sugar in a 1698 bill.43 The act lowered sugar duties to rates mandated in 1660, and it retained the large Restoration era differentials between imported raw and refined sugars. It also looked forward to a time in which large "Quantities of Brown and Muscavado Sugars" would be "refined here in England and afterwards exported to Foreign Markets."44 The Member who supported the bill promised that if this happened, "a great Number of People" would be "imployed and a Manufacture carryed on very profitable to this Kingdom."45 In effect, the statute mandated that English free laborers would process slave grown West Indian sugar in domestic refineries. In 1702-3, legislators passed another statute expanding the tax differentials that already favored English over foreign sugar importers and aimed to keep all but English refined sugar off domestic markets.46 Although both acts contained clauses offering bounties of partial duty drawbacks to those merchants who opened fresh for- eign markets to English refined sugar, they did not assure the prosperity of either the Royal African Company or of its enemies. The Revolution had weakened the Company's ability to protect itself from interlopers, but much of its monopoly still existed, and would until 1713. As long as the African Company held exclu- sive privileges, its agents harassed illicit traders and charged law abiding ones monopoly prices. Those representing sugar interests argued that the Company's presence and intimidation added unnecessary costs to the planting and manufacturing of sugar products. However, the Company's bid to replace its rela- tively benign royal charter with a more lethal Parliamentary statute threatened them more. Inside and outside Parliament, the Company's stockholders and friends lobbied for a statute that would reestablish and fortify the Royal African Company's authority. Despite their loss of Crown support after 1689, shareholders represented an influential combination of landlords and capitalists. The Compa- ny supporters included the Cumberland rentier and mine owning, John Lowther, the Liverpool slave trading merchant, Sir William Fazackerly, the Tory London sugar dealing Alderman, Sir Jeffrey Jeffreys, and a City member of Parliament, Sir John Fleet.47 They, and other Company stockholders, knew that the Royal African Company would prosper only if Parliament passed an act sanction- ing its monopoly. They clamored for that statute because it ensured Company profits needed to build ships, to maintain Afri- can trading settlements, and to pay attractive dividends to stockholders. This Company drive for legislative confirmation produced many petitions and much debate in every Parliamentary session from 1689 to 1698.48 These political battles among African traders, sugar industrialists, and joint stock company enthusiasts only intensified the more ruthless struggle between the Company and interlopers on the high seas, where a deadly competition for customers threatened to upend an entire industry. The political nation understood, if only from the fluctuations of Royal African Company stock, that such confrontations would persist until it wrote and policed fresh industry-defining laws. In 1698, Parliament attempted to stop internecine trade warfare with a compromise written into its second important sugar statute of that year.49 The "Act to Settle the Trade of Africa" ended many aspects of the trading monopoly of the Royal African Company, but it pre- served its corporate existence, and gave it thirteen more years of special privileges. Despite protests from the Company's enemies, supporters convinced Parliament that the Company was essential to protect England's African trade. Promoters argued that the "highly beneficial and advantagious" intercourse between England and its colonies relied on Company "Forts and Castles on the . . . Coast of Africa."50 To reward the Company for their military protection of England's African trade, Parliament agreed to place a ten per cent ad valorem duty on all exports from the colonies and England to Africa; the statute also promised that the state would collect and transfer these funds to the Company for maintenance of forts and payment of other corporate expenses.51 To assuage Company enemies, the act placed two limitations on the Royal African Company's privileges. First, to secure passage of the Bill, Parliament exempted the slave trade from the ten percent tax.52 Separate traders could now battle the Company, and one another, to supply sugar planters with the cheapest and choicest African slaves. Second, Parliament placed a thirteen year limit on the life of this act.53 Legislators agreed to renew the act after 1712 if they found that it satis- fied Parliament's objectives for the trade. Slave traders, sugar businessmen, and free traders prepared to block its renewal the day after Parliament passed the bill. Kenneth Davies has written the story of the Company's lost monopoly, and it is unnecessary to reproduce all stages of that tale here.54 However, it is worth noting that the compromise of 1698 pleased neither side. The Company still complained about inadequate revenues to maintain forts or to pay respectable dividends, and the free traders condemned the ten percent tax on all imported English commodities. Meanwhile, West Indian plant- ers grew more sugar, but neither lower prices for slaves nor the projected expansion of sugar markets through cheaper prices developed during the compromise period. Planters increased output, but this required that they import more of the raw mate- rials required for sugar-making, and those materials often car- ried the extra tax. Planters, merchants, and refiners petitioned yearly against this extra cost placed for the Company's benefit on their trade. Implicit in their complaints against the ten percent ad valorem duty paid to the Company was their often more explicit argument that higher taxes on commodities related to sugar production kept its selling price too dear for it to reach the potential market of England's poorest people.55 Illegal trade continued after 1698, and petitions demanding an end to the Royal African Company's privileges flooded Parlia- ment. Anti-Company planters, merchants, shippers, bankers, and refiners pressured legislators to end the compromise of 1698. After 1712, they had their way: Parliament refused to renew the Royal African Company prerogatives in that year. Sugar prices fell after 1713, but costs also declined--in part because the end of war reduced shipping costs--rapidly enough to deliver a cheap- er commodity to even working class consumers. Despite the Navi- gation Acts, sugar industrialists had finally gained the ever- expanding home market that they had sought for decades. After 1713, Parliamentary statutes still directed that plantation owners from Antigua, Montserrat, Barbados, Nevis, St. Christo- pher, and Jamaica send their sugar to England before reexporting it abroad. Only smuggled sugar now escaped English ports, but Parliamentary statutes and planter cooperation helped to reduce the amount of this illegal sugar trading over the next decades.56 With a predictable, profitable, and expanding empire-wide market- place, sugar growers (more or less) obeyed the Navigation Acts for the remainder of the eighteenth century. Their profits increased because an English appetite for cheap sugar and its byproducts spread rapidly throughout Great Britain and its colo- nies. Thereafter, the percentage of English West Indian sugar sold abroad declined rapidly.57 By the 1730s, the English con- sumed over ninety percent of this sugar, and the Americans used another three percent. Sugar reexports became so negligible in the 1730s, that Parliament took it off the enumerated list and West Indian planters were able to sell their product freely any place in the world.58 Even before 1739, however, most English sugar interests prospered, with the notable exceptions of the almost moribund Royal African Company and the many American colonists who hated other Navigation Acts restrictions on sugar refining in the colonies. Joint-Venturing Beneficiaries Although historians still debate whether West Indian sugar profits fueled an eighteenth-century Industrial Revolution, they agree that capital from Europe propelled the sugar trade in the seventeenth century.59 The relationship between European nations and the sugar Islands was, from the start, more like that between town and country than colony and metropolis.60 The English West Indian colonies at first looked more to the Dutch for capital than to the English, but the enactment of stricter Navigation Acts confined that relationship to the mother country from 1651 to 1689. After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament fully nour- ished the more symbiotic relationship between the plantations and the empire that became the hallmark of English sugar's joint- venturing industrial success in the eighteenth century. The West Indies produced some of their own necessities, but after 1650 the mother country provided the colonies with labor, provisions, animals, and manufactured goods.61 "Africa supplied the labour force, North America the foodstuffs, draft animals, and building materials, while Great Britain provided a wide assortment of goods, and most of the shipping, insurance, finan- cial, and mercantile services."62 Cash, however, to start and maintain sugar plantations was the first vital commodity, and, in the seventeenth century, it often came from English sponsors or arrived with English owners. Before and after 1689, English families invested or lent capital to establish West Indian sugar plantations.63 They or their representatives landed in the islands intending to enrich themselves by selling as much sugar as they could compel black slaves to produce. Beyond this, they dreamed of making money and returning home rich. Profiting in an environment of hurricanes and potential slave revolts always depended on commercial support from England, and the greatest rewards went to planters with large estates, predictable sources of credit, easy access to slaves, and trustworthy business con- tacts in England.64 The most successful plantation owners came from well-placed English families, but all relied on motherland patronage. Sever- al biographies of West Indian fortunes illustrate this cross- Atlantic entrepreneurial interdependence. For the Stapletons, a West Indian fortune began at the top with protection from Charles II. The king appointed the Irish Cavalier Colonel William Sta- pleton to be Deputy Governor of Montserrat in the 1660s.65 Before he died, Stapleton amassed a fortune from his several West Indian island plantations as well as the real estate he owned in England. Substantial Island and English holdings provided his heirs with enough income so that they never had to live on their West Indian plantations. The second and third generation of Stapletons became Oxfordshire baronets who owned a Parliamentary seat for decades after 1699, and who employed estate agents to manage their Nevis plantation, while they (or their lawyers) oversaw their other investments, including East India Company stock.66 Some Englishmen began their West Indian business careers without the protection of kings, and had to remain in the Islands longer than the first generation of Stapletons before they or their heirs could return home wealthy. The Pinneys of Bristol and Nevis were one such family.67 Azariah Pinney entered the sugar business unintentionally after a West country judge trans- ported him to the Islands for participating in Monmouth's rebel- lion. Despite his radical past, Azariah succeeded in sugar, owing in part to crucial aid from Gloucestershire relatives. The Pinneys were landholders and lace makers in Bristol, and Azariah combined family credit and personal business talents to prosper. He made an early reputation for honesty through his management of sugar plantations for some of the Island's prominent absentee landowners, and, simultaneously, established commercial contacts for the time after he bought his first estate at a foreclosure sale: "With this small plantation as a nucleus he added property by purchase and marriage to a sugar heiress until he had one of the great estates on the island at the time of his death in 1720."68 This branch of the Pinney family did not return to Bristol until the 1780s, but their sugar crops arrived annually from the beginning of the eighteenth century. West Indian plantation owners had several options when joint-venturing in the sugar trade. Their link with the home market might be a banker or a slave trading merchant who acted as their sugar agent in a metropolitan port. Sir Josiah Child, banker, landowner, and East Indian Company Director, for example, was the London guarantor of Samuel Bache, a Jamaican sugar plant- er. Bache was originally an island merchant when, in 1672, he and Child agreed to "build a sugar works and settle a plantation of 1,330 acres in that Island."69 Child bought the necessary servants, slaves, and supplies, while Bache managed their estate. Other planters started with less land, slaves, and capital than the Child-Bache connection, but their operations relied just as consequentially on the English agents who extended them credit, supplied their raw materials, and received their sugar ship- ments.70 Smaller growers might barter informally with interlop- ing ship captains, but they rarely succeeded without a recurring commercial association with English creditors. Those who pros- pered most imitated the liaison between Josiah Child and Samuel Bache: they collaborated with partners in London, Bristol, Liver- pool, Whitehaven, or Glasgow to create the sugar fortunes that might bring them home rich. After returning, many, such as Sir Peter Collerton, the Littletons, the Merricks, and the Freres continued to pour money into their West Indian properties, but they also invested their sugar profits into "more valuable property in England."71 After 1713, the largest West Indian planters freed them- selves from debt-dependent relationships with English partners, but they still needed English commercial connections. By the mid-eighteenth century, these English agents operated less as equals and more as hired distributors for large plantation own- ers. The plantation owners, most of whom enriched themselves before 1722, now consigned their sugar cargoes to an English middleman or to a metropolitan firm that arranged its sale to sugar refineries: thus the London West Indian sugar "fee- commissioner" began his history.72 These agents still performed exchange services for the planters, but the slave holding growers had liberated themselves from their dependency on English copart- ners.73 Except for their employment of slaves rather than wage workers, sugar planters appeared every bit the industrial capi- talist by the 1720s. They employed capital to finance their business, they dominated their labor force, they employed ships to carry their sugar to markets, and they salaried their fee- earning commercial agents who lived in London, Bristol, or Glas- gow. Profits and interest were theirs to distribute as they sold sugar ever more cheaply within a constantly expanding domestic market. Meanwhile, for a two or three percent commission, their agents negotiated "the certificate of discharge, and paid the customs."74 Sugar's Collateral Business Beneficiaries English seventeenth- and eighteenth-century sugar-industry- history tells the tale of an interconnected all Atlantic English capitalist enterprise on its way to becoming an agro-business. Although slaves grew some of their own food, the West Indian plantations depended on goods from elsewhere to operate their "monoculture."75 Sugar was virtually the only export of the West Indies, and its production employed almost all the working hours of slave populations.76 African slaves were the most costly raw material for making sugar, and planters sought constantly to buy the cheapest replacements they could find.77 Each year, they ordered more slaves, and these laborers arrived in "English" ships built outside the West Indies but within the English em- pire. The English government never counted these ships among West Indian imports, but they were the prerequisite for the making and selling of Island sugar.78 Next to the black slaves, ships were the most conspicuous English commodity employed in the sugar industry.79 The Royal African Company held the only license to trade with Africa and the West Indies from the 1660s until it lost its monopoly in 1713. During this period, it built or hired the largest percent- age of ships in the trade, and it engaged most of them in West Indian rather than African exchanges. The Company sent only one or two ships annually to bring African ivory, wax, hides, or gum from Africa, but it built or chartered dozens to carry slaves from Africa to the West Indies each year. It used many of these ships to shuttle goods from England to and from the West Indies or to bring sugar byproducts from the islands to the coast of Africa. From 1703 to 1709, for example, the Company engaged 31 of these ships just to swap West Indian rum for slaves.80 Despite its monopoly, The Royal African Company never built, controlled, or chartered all the sugar or slave ships. From widely dispersed ports, interloping American, English, Irish, and Scottish carriers regularly invaded its trade after 1660.81 Ships from new England bought African slaves and traded them for sugar byproducts, such as molasses and rum during almost the entire history of the English West Indies.82 Chesapeake ship- builders waited until the Royal African Company lost its monopoly in 1713, but after that they too freighted ships for West Indian customers.83 In England, the competition to ship and sell slaves in the West Indies began in the 1660s when interlopers and smug- glers hauled slaves one way and sugar the other. This illicit trade grew to greatness after 1698, and, after 1713, anyone who owned "English," ships any place within the English empire, might carry goods from Atlantic ports to Africa and the West Indies. By the time that England and Scotland united, Bristol, Liverpool, and Glasgow built 200-odd ships that traded in the West Indies annually.84 As the years of pickup and delivery passed, Great Britain established a "regular or shuttle service" between major Atlantic ports and all West Indian harbors.85 Empire-wide ship- building and West Indian sugar-making became increasingly inter- dependent industries from 1689 to 1722. These Atlantic-wide exchanges of commodities united plant- ers, ships' captains, merchants, and manufacturers in the produc- tion of inexpensive sugar. To reduce its cost to a level to where its selling price became irresistible to domestic and foreign consumers, all elements within the industry attempted to slash unit costs of production.86 Planters, for example, cut their costs by focusing their slaves' entire working day on readying sugar for export.87 Black Africans spent so much time growing sugar and readying it for export that they had little time to produce their own food, clothing, and shelter. These necessities came from elsewhere, and English entrepreneurs par- ticularly benefited from sending everyday commodities to the West Indies. In Barbados, for example, slaves "were not only Cloathed with Manufactury of England, but a great part of their Eatables and Drinkables came from these also."88 In December 1690, almost two dozen bankers, merchants, and manufacturers acknowledged this motherland dependence on the West Indies when they begged the House of Lords to reject a tax bill increasing duties paid by English rum makers because it would destroy distilleries and a host of other sugar related businesses. If the statute passed, the petitioners warned of falling state revenues, and the "West India navigation which breeds up so many seamen, and employs so great a number of ships" will abate.89 They worried too about the "many thousands" who would lose employment within the refin- ing industry.90 The West Indian colonies provided markets for manufacturers and farmers throughout the empire.91 To the eighteenth century historian, John Oldmixon, the sugar islands meant customers for English makers of "'Axes, Saw, Wimbles, Nails, and other Iron Tools and Materials'."92 Later historians have added to Oldmixon treasure-trove of sugar related industries that operated through- out the empire to supply goods to West Indian populations.93 A "great supplier of provisions for the West Indies from 1670 to 1720 was Ireland," and from Cork and Kinsale came "barrels of beef, pork, butter and cheese" for sale in the sugar islands.94 Americans were also providers for the West Indian sugar planta- tions, and one Pennsylvanian Quaker alone sold "83 casks, 174 half barrels, 66 quarter barrels, and 9 barrels of flour to some 100 customers in Port Royal during a six-month period in 1699."95 "Live cattle, salt, beef, pork, fish, and onions," even arrived in the West Indies from Bermuda during the early eighteenth century.96 The sugar islands received agricultural and manufactured goods from everywhere in the empire, but they also returned the basic raw material for multiple English, Scottish, Irish, and American industries. In the eighteenth century, middlemen mar- keted West Indian sugar to distillers, refiners, and bakers throughout Great Britain and the colonies.97 Rum making was important, but the refining and food industries spread more rapidly and touched more lives. Sugar made up approximately ten percent of England's total imports after 1700, and little of it left the country after 1722.98 English refineries consumed most of the sugar as their numbers increased from six to thirty be- tween 1660 to 1690. One hundred and twenty of them processed 5,000 tons of brown sugar annually by the 1750s. Deere estimates that there were eighty refineries in London, twenty in Bristol, and several in Chester, Liverpool, Lancaster, Whitehaven, Newcas- tle, Hull, and Southampton at mid-century.99 Scotland had a small sugar refining industry before Union, but it added numerous sugar houses in Glasgow after 1707.100 Refineries even rooted themselves in Ireland: "Until the rise of large-scale brewing and distilling at the end of the [eighteenth] century," sugar refining attracted more investment capital than any other Dublin investment.101 Producers of fruit and alcoholic drinks integrated sugar in the making of cherry, currant, gooseberry, raspberry, and cowslip wine.102 Molasses, of course, was the basic ingredi- ent for a rum industry and North Americans imported hundreds of thousands of gallons of it annually.103 As the empire's popula- tion consumed more sugar, grocers, confectioners, and bakers enlarged their commercial activities to supply what was rapidly becoming the world's single largest market for products made from sugar. Throughout the English empire, sugar related industries provided employment for millions of workers. The use of slaves on sugar plantations made it a unique English business, but slave labor was never the only labor employed in sugar connected indus- tries.104 Although some historians believe that "free wage earn- ers hardly figure in sugar's history between the" late seven- teenth and early nineteenth centuries, an examination of the sugar trade proves that slave labor accounted for but a small percentage of the total labor time that went into the making, transporting, and selling of sugar and its innumerable by- products.105 The procedure for making English sugar never began or ended in the West Indies. Even ignoring the amount of wage labor that went into growing and manufacturing the food, cloth- ing, tools, and ships that planters and slave's used, the trans- porting, unpacking, refining, distilling, and selling of sugar products took place well after slaves finished adding their labor time to the manufacturing of raw sugar or molasses. The West Indian sector of the all-Atlantic English sugar industry employed slave labor because free labor was unavailable for these colonies in the eighteenth century: English workers were unwilling to work in the West Indies growing sugar while more attractive choices existed in England and the American colonies. English labor, nevertheless, went into the production of English sugar at every stage after it left the West Indies. Wage workers throughout the empire transported, unpacked, refined, baked, and marketed sugar in the cities of England, Scotland, New England, and Ireland. They also built the ships that carried English sugar from the West Indies to empire ports, and they manned the English navy that protected this empire-wide capitalist industry. Conclusions Four factors distinguished the sugar industry from other English manufacturing enterprises. First, sugar-making was an all-Atlantic joint venture, and English capitalists and West Indian planters combined to profit from a commodity consumed almost entirely in England. English investors and merchants dominated the industry in its first decades of existence, but, despite their loss of trade-control to plantation owners in the eighteenth century, sugar profiteering built on its original systematic cross-Atlantic commercial relationship benefiting all its entrepreneurs. Second, sugar production linked Great Brit- ain's agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial sectors on both sides of the Atlantic. Not only did most of the raw materials for producing West Indian sugar come from diverse parts of Eng- land and its empire, but the West Indian sugar industry itself spawned and nourished numerous ancillary industries in the home country. Third, the sugar industry employed labor from large populations of slaves and free workers, not merely from one or the other. Finally, the sugar industry found its economy of scale before any other English business. Sugar manufacturers were able to reduce unit costs of production so fast that they created an ever-expanding market for their products within Great Britain'spopulation despite the Navigation Acts. Although the sugar businesses were unique in these ways, they shared one characteristic with all English industries from 1689 to 1722. A Parliament of landlords and capitalists, with differing degrees of self-interest in sugar, legislated their futures as much as they did the futures of English road building entrepreneurs, river improvers, shipbuilders, and corn farmers. That Parliament also shaped the commercial relationships between manufacturers and merchants trading East Indian textiles, Chesa- peake tobacco, and Newcastle coal. These are the subjects of the remaining three chapters. Chapter Seven: Endnotes (1) This chapter is based on the following secondary works: K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (1957; New York: Atheneum, 1970), and The North Atlantic World in the Seventeenth Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974); Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London: MacMillan, 1962); Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar, 2 vols. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1949); Gary Stuart De Krey, A Fractured Society: The Politics of London in the First Age of Party, 1688-1715 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: Univer- sity of North Carolina Press, 1972); Ellen Deborah Ellis, An Introduction to the History of Sugar as A Commodity: A Disserta- tion Presented to the Faculty of Bryn Mawr College for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Philadelphia: John C. Winston, 1905); Vincent T. Harlow, A History of Barbados, 1625-1685 (1926; re- printed, New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969); Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth-Century exper- iment in Social Engineering (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin Books, 1985); Richard Pares, Merchants and Planters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); A West- India Fortune, (1950; reprinted, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968); Frank Wesley Pitman, The Development of the British West Indies: 1700-1763, (1917: reprinted, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967); and Richard Sheridan, The Development of the Plantations to 1750: An Era of West Indian Prosperity, 1750-1775 (Barbados: Caribbean University Press, 1970); Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623-1775 (Baltimore, Mary- land: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). (2) Typical of such petitions is the following which brought planters, transporters, merchants, and manufacturers together to argue for protecting themselves and their industries: "A Petition of several Merchants and Planters trading to and interested in their Majesties Sugar Plantations, was read; setting forth, That the Product of the Plantations are much lessened by heavy Taxes; and that, the last Session of this Parliament, an Act passed, which imposed a high Duty on Spirits drawn from Melasses, above what was laid on Spirits drawn from other Materials . . . which was a very great Damage to the Plantations, and the Refining Trade of this Nation" (Journal of the House of Commons, 10:592), 18 December 1691. (3) See Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, Chapter Seventeen, "Booms and Slumps in War and Peace, 1623-1713," 389-414. (4) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, has a brief account of what he calls the "Sugar Revolution," 128-134. (5) Deere, History of Sugar, 1:166. For a brief history of the sugar colonies in general see, 1:146-157: for the English colo- nies see 1:158-207. (6) Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 203. (7) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 392, and appendix V, 496-497. (8) Davies, North Atlantic World, 188. (9) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 392. (10) For the history of Barbados during the Interregnum, see Harlow, Barbados, 83-127. (11) Ellis, Sugar as a Commodity, 83-86. (12) C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660, (1911; reprinted Holmes Beach, Florida: William Gaunt, 1972), 2:559-562, "An Act for increase of Ship- ping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation." See also, Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 130. (13) Ellis, Sugar As A Commodity, 106-107. (14) For a synopsis of the struggle see, Davies, Royal African Company, Chapter 3, "Monopoly and Competition," 97-152. (15) Cecil T. Carr, ed., Select Charters of Trading Companies: A. D. 1530-1707 (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1913), xlii-xlviii; 172-182 and 186-192 for the first two charters. When the first Company failed, Charles issued the second Charter reconstituting the Company as the Royal African Company. (16) For the history of these early days of the African Company, see Davies, Royal African Company, Chapter 2, "Capital and Fi- nance," 47-96. (17) Davies, Royal African Company, 103. (18) Davies, Royal African Company, 64. For the entire list see, Carr, ed., Selected Charters, 173. (19) Davies, Royal African Company, 104. (20) Carr, ed., Selected Charters, 187-189. (21) Davies, Royal African Company, 42-43, 361-366. (22) Ibid., 113. (23) For sugar rates, see "Grocery Wares," 12 Car. II, c. 4. (Statutes of the Realm, 192). For additional duties on sugar before 1685, see 25 Car. II, c. 7. (24) Firth and Rait, Acts and Ordinances, 1:62 and 2:1128-1129. (25) Deere, History of Sugar, 2:427-30: claying was a process for whitening sugar. (26) 12 Car. II, c 4, and 25 Car. II, c. 7. See also, Deere, History of Sugar, 2:427. (27) For a succinct treatment of sugar duties and the battles between planters and refiners over this division of labor see Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 50-53. (28) 12 Car. II, c. 18, section 18. Parliament reinforced this Act in 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 26, section 7: "An Act to p'vent the planting of Tobacco in England, and for regulateing the Planta- tion Trade." The other colonial commodities besides sugar and tobacco were: cotton wool,indigo, ginger, and dyeing woods. (29) 15 Car. II, c. 7, section 7. (30) The literature on the struggle against royal monopolies during the 1680 is large. For a concise account of the rivalries see Davies, "Monopoly and Competition," Chapter Three, Royal African Company, 97-152. (31) Ibid., 101-122. (32) 1 Jac. II, c. 4. The Act granted James additional revenues on tobacco as well. Parliament set the Act to expire on June, 1693. (33) Leo Francis Stock, ed., Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, 5 vols. (Washing- ton: Carnegie Institution, 1924), 1:423-433. (34) Frank Pitman explained both the complexity and the results of the act: "Refined sugar as well as raw sugar was exported, particularly to the East Country, that is the Baltic ports. a decline in the export of refined sugar, however, set in after the increase of import duties on sugar from the colonies in 1685 under James II. As no drawback of duty was allowed on refined sugar exported, its price abroad rose until competition with Dutch and French refineries was impossible. On raw sugar the whole additional duty could be drawn back with the result that exports of raw sugar continued undisturbed. In fact, the relief from English competition in refined sugar stimulated the Conti- nental refineries to make larger demands for the British raw product" (Development of the British West Indies, 156-157). (35) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 392, 401, 496. (36) George Louis Beer, The Old Colonial System: 1660-1754: Part I: The Establishment of the System, 1660-1688, 2 vols. (New York: Peter Smith, 1933), 1:165. (37) Davies, Royal African Company, 129-130. (38) Ibid., 123. (39) Journal of the House of Commons, 11:114. (40) Ibid., 115. (41) See 2 Will. & M., Sess. 2, c. 5, and 4 Will. & M., c. 15. Needing revenue for the war against France, Parliament passed the first of these acts (1690) to continue the added rates on sugar and tobacco. Members promised, however, to return rates to their 1660 level in 1696. The second statutes carried out this promise in regard to sugar, but it kept the rates on tobacco at the 1685 level. (42) For this debate, see Davies, Royal African Company, 122- 134. (43) Parliament passed 7 & 8 Will. III, c. 22, "An Act for preventing Frauds and regulating Abuses in the Plantation trade," to protect the lawful trade against cheats and smugglers in 1695. 9 Will. III, c. 23, section 6 protected England's refineries from West Indian or other competition. (44) Ibid., section 6. (45) Ibid. (46) 2 & 3 Anne, c. 18. See Deere, History of Sugar, 2:429-430 for the a chart showing the differentials in sugar duties by class for the years 1661, 1698, 1705, and after. (47) For Fazackerly see, Alfred P. Wadsworth and Julia De Lacy Mann, The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire, 1600-1780 (1931; reprinted, New York: August M. Kelley, 1968), 149; for Lowther, see Davies, Royal African Company, 66; and for Fleet and Jeffreys, see De Krey, A Fractured Society, 140. (48) For the debates see Stock, Proceedings and Debates, 2:216- 220, 222-224, 230-232, 235-245; Journals of the House of Commons, 12:133, 185; and Davies, Royal African Company, 132-135. (49) 9 Will. III, c. 26, "An Act to settle the Trade to Africa." (50) Ibid., section 1. (51) Ibid., sections 2 and 3. (52) Ibid., sections 7 and 8. (53) Ibid., section 21. (54) Davies, Royal African Company, 122-152. (55) Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, 4 vols. (1930; reprinted, New York: Octagon Books, 1965), 2:139. For a sampling of petitions, re- ports, and letters on both sides of the African Trade issue in the year 1709, see 2:82-108. (56) Parliament passed 7 & 8 Will. III, c. 22, "An Act for preventing Frauds and regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade," because 12 Car. II, c.18, 15 Car. II, c. 7, 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 26, and 25 Car. II, c. 7 had not ended smuggling. Scotland continued to smuggle despite the English Navigation Acts until 6 Anne, c. 11 united the two kingdoms. (57) This reversed an almost fifty year pattern: "From 1650 until about the end of the 17th century, between one-half and two-thirds of the sugar imported into England from the colonies was re-exported to foreign markets" (Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 45). (58) Ibid., 32-33. Sugar became so unimportant a foreign trade item that Parliament permitted it, under special circumstances, to be shipped directly to European customers after 1739: see l2 Geo. II, c. 30 (Harper, English Navigation Acts, 399). (59) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 262-263. The debate about how much the West Indian sugar and slavery business financed the English Industrial Revolution began with Eric Williams, Capital- ism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). For a recent discussion of that debate see, Barbara Solow and Stanley L. Engerman, British Capitalism and Caribbean Slav- ery: The Legacy of Eric Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). See also I. K. Steel, "The Empire and Provincial Elites: An interpretation of some Recent Writings on the English Atlantic, 1675-1740," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Histo- ry 8 (1980): 2-32. (60) Pares, Merchants and Planters, 23, and Mintz, Sweetness and Power, 42. (61) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 338. See also I. K. Steel, "The Empire," 5-6. (62) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 14. (63) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 390. (64) Ibid., 278. (65) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 164-168. See also, Edwin F. Gay, "Notes and Documents: Letters from a Sugar Plantation in Nevis, 1723-1732," Journal of Economic and Business History, vol. 1 (1928-29): 149-173. (66) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 165 and Gay, "Notes and Docu- ments," 149-150. Sir William Stapleton III Held 1500 shares of East India Company stock, East India Company stock ledgers, 1719- 23, 605. (67) For the early history of the family, see Pares, West-India Fortune, 3-11. (68) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 167. (69) Ibid., 271. (70) The leading agents of Bristol slave voyages for the eight- eenth century are listed in David Richardson, "Bristol Slave Traders," Bristol Branch of the Historical Association, Local History Pamphlets Still in Print, 29-30. (71) K. D. Davies, "The Origins of the Commission System in the West Indies Trade," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 2 (1952): 91. (72) Ibid., 94. (73) Ibid., 94. (74) Ibid. (75) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 119. (76) For a contemporary view of slavery, see John Oldmixon, The British Empire in America: Containing the History of the Discov- ery, Settlement, Progress and State of the British Colonies on the Continent and Islands of America, 2 vols. (1708; reprinted, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), 2:131. (77) Davies, Royal African Company, 299. (78) Curtis Nettles, "The Place of Markets in the Old Colonial System," The New England Quarterly 6 (September, 1933): 497. (79) Sheridan, Davies, and Davis wrote chapters about the con- nection between shipping and the sugar trade: see, Davies, "Shipping," Royal African Company, 185-212; Sheridan, "A Grand Marine Empire, Sugar and Slavery, 306-338; Davis, "The American and West Indian Trade," English Shipping Industry, 267-299. (80) Ibid., 191. (81) Davis, English Shipping Industry, 268, and Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 327. (82) Davis, English Shipping Industry, 281. (83) Ibid., 275. (84) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 334. (85) Ibid., 333. (86) Ralph Davis, "English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 7 (1954): 153. (87) For a contemporary view of the sugar making process and its problems, see Thomas Tryon, Letters, Domestic and Foreign, To several Persons of Quality Occasionally distributed in Subjects, etc., London, 1700, letter number 34, "Of the making of Sugar," 200-218. (88) Ibid., 218. (89) Stock, Proceedings and Debates, 2:43. (90) Ibid. (91) Pitman, British West Indies, 189, and L. M. Cullen, An Economic History of Ireland since 1660 (London: B. T. Batsford, 1972), 13-14. (92) Oldmixon, The British Empire, 1:xxiii. (93) This trade "draws so many Trades after it, as to England, for Necessaries for the Subsistence and Clothing of the Planters, and their Families; to New-England and Carolina for Provisions; to New-York and Virginia for Bread, Pork, Flower, Indian Corn, and Tobacco; to Guinea for Negroes; to Madeira for Wine; to Terceras and Fyall for Wine and Brandy; to the Isles of May and Curassau for Salt; and to Ireland for Beef and Pork; but that Trade is somewhat lessened lately" (ibid., 2:159-166). (94) Davis, English Shipping Industry, 269. (95) Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 273-274. (96) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 313. (97) Pares, Merchants and Planters, 24, and Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 339-359. (98) Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, English Overseas Trade Statis- tics, 1697-1808 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 10-14 and Sheri- dan, Sugar and Slavery, 19-20. (99) Deere, History of Sugar, 2:458. (100) William Robert Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720, 3 vols. (1912; reprinted, Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1968), 3:137. (101) David Dickson, "The Place of Dublin in the Eighteenth- Century Irish Economy," in Ireland and Scotland, 1600-1850: Parallels and Contrasts in Economic and Social Development, T. M. Devine and David Dickson, ed., (Edinburgh: John Donald Publish- ers, 1983), 181. (102) Pares, Merchants and Planters, 26. See also, Deere, History of Sugar, 168. (103) Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, 341. (104) Discussion of slavery from a Marxist viewpoint can be found in the works of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Eugene Genovese, Sidney Mintz, and G. E. M. de Ste. Croix cited in my bibliogra- phy. (105) Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power, 32.